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2Adequate food safety concerns all nations and aects everyone's lives. In
that sense, food safety is an international issue. However, the regulation of
food products to achieve a desired level of safety has traditionally been a purely
national matter with governments determining what minimum standards will
apply to the food products sold and consumed within their own borders. How-
ever, this picture is changing with the increasing internationalization of the food
supply and the signature of multilateral trade agreements between nations.
This paper focuses specically on the relationship between World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) agreements and American regulation of food products and
additives. Section I provides background information on how the United States
regulates domestic and imported food products. Section 11 explains the nature
of the WTO agreements and the WTO dispute settlement process; discusses
the WTO dispute between the EU2, Canada, and the US over administration
of growth hormones to increase beef production (Meat Hormones); reveals par-
allel domestic issues in the US regarding scientic uncertainty and the eect
of federalism on state sovereignty; and considers the relationship between food
regulation and environmental ethics in the context of three WTO panel reports
(Tuna I, Tuna 11, and Shrimp). Finally, Section HI considers the domestic pol-
icy implications of the WTO agreements as interpreted by the WTO dispute
settlement body and applied in the context of food; and makes recommendations
as to
'While other multilateral agreements, such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement (UCFTA), could
impact domestic food regulation as well, this paper
focuses on the WTO agreements as perhaps the most comprehensive and inclusive
set of international agreements to date. NAFTA and UCFTA both contain rules
pertaining to sanitary and phytosanitary
measures like those at issue in the Meat Hormones dispute. For a critique of NAFTA's
potential threat to American food safety laws, see generally Public Citizen Global
Trade Watch, NAFTA 's Broken Promises:
Fast Track to Unsafe Food, September 1997.
2
The European Union (EU) subsumed the European Communities (EC). For con-
sistency, I refer throughout
I
3how concerned parties should continue to act, at both the national and
international levels, to address the dicult issues raised in the Meat Hormones,
Tuna, and Shrimp disputes.
I. Overview of the US Food Re2ulatorv System
Before exploring the relationship between international treaties and domestic
regulation, it is necessary to understand the United States' basic system for
regulating food products, including imports. Essentially, three governmental
entities can create food law in the US: the US Congress, US administrative
agencies, and the states. First, the US Congress can directly pass laws relating
to food and food safety. For instance, the Tuna and Shrimp disputes discussed
below both arose from federal laws passed by Congress. More typically though,
Congress leaves food policy decisions to administrative agencies, occasionally
amending their implementing statutes to reect Congressional policy changes.
Most agencies can create their own rules, eectively federal laws, through formal
or informal procedures, so long as they are aimed at furthering Congressional
objectives within the limits of the Constitution. Agencies have some discretion,
for instance enforcement discretion, when applying these laws and rules, which
they utilize to handle micro-policy issues that arise in daily practice. Finally,
state governments may pass laws applicable to their own jurisdictions so long
as they are not preempted by federal law. As for the relationship between all
these laws, rules, and discretionary judgments, each is generally preempted by
a decision at a higher level. Until relatively recently, therefore, the voice of
Congress was the nal source of authority on domestic food regulation in the
US and subject only to the limits of other federal laws and the
to the EU.
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4Constitution. Today, however, Congress must also consider the United
States' obligations under the WTO agreements and other multilateral treaties.
Two US government agencies share primary responsibility for ensuring the
safety of the domestic food supply: the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). USDA regulates meat and poultry
products under the auspices of its Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
and its Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). FDA regulates
all other domestic and imported food articles under the auspices of its Center
for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) and its Center for Veterinary
Medicine (CVM). In practice, FDA and USDA inspectors must make practical
decisions every day about the safety and wholesomeness of food imports to which
they usually do not have access during the manufacturing process. These day-
today decisions may be complicated by lack of information about food safety
policy and enforcement in importing countries, as well as by formal or informal
recognition of potential food safety crises in importing countries, for example
trichinosis or mad cow disease. To improve the validity of the process and
to maximize food safety, both FDA and USDA work with their international
counterparts to facilitate cooperation and
3
standard-setting. Indeed, given the impossibility of conclusively determining
the safety and wholesomeness of every single imported food article, countries
must necessarily rely
to varying degrees on the interests of other nations in maintaining a safe
food supply through enforcement of high standards.
US food safety and quality standards apply equally to imported and domestic
foodstus. USDA requires meat and poultry imports to be produced under
standards
3
5equivalent to those of the US for safety, wholesomeness, and labeling accuracy.4
Regarding processed meats, FSIS evaluates individual countries' processing and
inspection systems and approves those that are equal to or stronger than that of
the US; approved countries may then certify local processors for US importing
purposes. FSIS inspectors examine certied plants two to three times annu-
ally to evaluate actual compliance, and work with their foreign counterparts
to achieve compliance where it is lacking and to decertify as necessary. Live
animals are tested and quarantined both abroad and in the US. USDA main-
tains inspectors in foreign countries to ensure enforcement of the testing and
quarantine requirements.5
While USDA handles meat, FDA veries that all other domestic and im-
ported food articles are safe, unadulterated, and properly branded within the
meaning of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. Section 381 of the FFDCA
permits FDA to place a hold at the border on imported food articles suspected,
due to examination or otherwise, to violate the good manufacturing process,
adulteration, or misbranding sections of the
 See US FDA, FDA in the International Arena, FDA website (July 1997) <http://www.fda.gov/oia/fdaintl.htm>.
4See USDA, Importing Meat and Poultry to the United States, USDA Food Safety and
Inspection Service website (16 January 1998) <http://www.usda.gov/fsis/imports.htm>.
Some American public interest groups have raised concerns about reduced ecacy in
the inspection process as a result of multilateral trade
agreements. See Public Citizen, International Harmonization of Social, Economic and
Environmental Standards, 16 (noting increased importation of contaminated meat un-
der the US-Canada Free Trade
Agreement) & 22 (questioning compliance of Mexican poultry with US food safety
standards following
NAFrA). One major issue in this regard is what constitutes equivalent standards for
purposes of more lax enforcement through physical inspection. A related issue is what
must be equivalent given the WTO
agreements' disallowance of process distinctions. As indicated in the Statement of
Administrative Action pertaining to the WTQ and the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act [hereinafter Statement of Administrative Action], 8431(1), the US amended the
Federal Meat Inspection Act 820(e) to reect US obligations under the WTO. Congress
replaced the language that required foreign producers to meet standards equivalent to
or better than those in the US with language that required foreign producers to comply
with requirements that achieve an equivalent or better level of sanitary protection than
the US.
 Conversation with Dr. Ronald Caey, USDA APHIS, 30 January 1998. In the case
of BSE, or mad cow disease, for example, 31 countries currently cannot import fresh
meat unless it has been processed in a
specic way, i.e. deboned, etc., and certied by the UK counterpart of APHIS as not
having been fed ruminant protein in feed. Id.
4
6Act. FDA also regularly issues import alerts. These alerts may be based
upon past history or other information that suggests particular imports contain
violations. FDA inspectors may automatically detain goods that come from a
particular manufacturer, from a particular food source, or belong to a particular
food class.6 This administrative action can even extend to automatic detention
of products from an entire country or national region when there appear to be
geographically widespread instances of the violation? The authority to hold
imports on suspicion alone must reect Congress's concern about FDA's inabil-
ity to inspect imports during manufacture as it does domestic goods. When a
product is detained at the border, the burden shifts to the importer to prove
that the article meets applicable FDA standards. If the importer fails and the
articles are rejected, the importer may re-export them in certain circumstances
as an alternative to their destruction.8
II. Internationalizin2 Food Trade and the Role of the WTO
Food technology has grown amazingly complex in the last century. The
complicated world of preservatives, additives, and food biotechnology has placed
new demands on science to establish food safety, while simultaneously raising
ethical questions related to the relationship between food and technology and
between food
6See US FDA, Overview of Import Program, FDA Oce of Regulatory Aairs
website (November 1997)
<http:llwww.fda.gov/ora/importlorajmpoitsystem.txt>.
 FDA rarely pursues this extreme option, and only after exhausting other options.
Id.
 The FFDCA 6334(d) explains the circumstances under which re-exportation
within 90 days of refusal is permitted, including: (I) the adulteration, misbranding or
violation occurred prior to shipment to the US, (2) the importer had no cause to know
of such violation, and (3) re-exportation to a country other than that of origin does
not violate 6381(e) regarding exports. Section 334(d) species that articles condemned
under certain regulations, e.g., because potentially injurious to human health, may not
be re-exported. See, e.g., United States v. 76,552 Pounds of Frog Legs, 423 F.Supp.
329 (S.D.Tex. 1976). Note that 6418 of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 aects
condemned imported goods but does not apply to refused imports during the 90 day
re-export window (Covington & Burling, Short Summary of the FDA Modernization
Act, at 37 (12 January 1997)).
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7production/harvesting methods and the environment. In the face of scientic
uncertainty and philosophical debate, the inherently subjective component of
food regulation becomes most obvious. There is simply no one right way to
answer these questions, and, as mentioned above, nation states have historically
acted alone in making these balancing decisions and establishing what each
considers appropriate minimum standards.
While international treaties like the WTO agreements certainly do not dic-
tate one right way, they do put some limits on sovereignty by their nature.9 Just
as the American federal government sometimes preempts state governments in
the interest of facilitating trade among states and creating more uniform stan-
dards, nations that trade signicantly with other nations have found global
harmonization of standards to be an increasingly attractive goal. Today, most
international trade agreements cite harmonization as a signicant component
of any plan to level the playing eld for trading nations. International insti-
tutions like the Codex Alimentarius, discussed infra, create international stan-
dards which countries are encouraged to utilize in making domestic regulation.'0
Together, international treaties and institutions push domestic policy-makers
towards keeping in step with their international neighbors. The concern that
follows, as will be discussed below, is whether such pressure drives a race to the
bottom.
Domestic politics naturally reect signicant agreements at the international
level. For instance, the US recently addressed global harmonization of food
standards in
 The Statement of Administrative Action, submitted by the US House of Repre-
sentatives to the President, and recommending ratication of the WTO agreements:
US sovereignty is fully protected under the
WTO...WTO dispute settlement panels will not have any power to change US law or
order such a change. Only Congress and the Administration can decide whether to
implement a WTO panel recommendation
and, if so, how to implement it. US Statement of Administrative Action, 3. While this
is technically true because of the legal and practical limitations on VITO enforcement,
its implication of free reign is
exaggerated, as this paper is intended to show.
10 The International Standards Organization (ISO) also sets standards that are in-
creasingly important in
6
8international trade, but its role is beyond the scope of this paper.
See Covington and Burling, Short Summary of FDA Modernization Act of 1997, at
33 (12 January 1997).
the FDA Modernization Act of 1997. In 6410(b) of the Act, Congress in-
structs FDA to support reduced regulation, and increased harmonization of
regulatory requirements, so long as doing so is consistent with consumer protec-
tion; FDA should also generally facilitate mutual recognition and harmoniza-
tion agreements. Since these obligations arise from a purely domestic political
command, they, of course, leave signicant room for agency discretion in inter-
pretation and application. Realistically, FDA' s own commitment to 6410 will
likely be more determinative of its eect than the language of the statute. While
Congress may have legitimately intended to shift FDA's stance on regulation
and/or harmonization, it must surely also have been motivated by a desire to
show good faith in meeting its international treaty obligations, and it would
not likely expect FDA to satisfy the mandate in a way contradictory to larger
US food policy. In contrast to such purely domestic mandates complementary
to international agreements, the treaties themselves may impose real limits on
sovereignty in deference to the agreed goal of free trade and harmonization. A
treaty's bilateral nature creates enforcement incentives that do not exist between
Congress and an administrative agency. WTO trade treaties also naturally err
on the side of free trade and the WTO dispute settlement body has indicated
that it will narrowly construe exceptions for trade restrictive national action.
A. The World Trade Organization12
The WTO is an international member organization that administers the
General Agreement on Taris and Trade (GA'IT) and a host of other treaties.
The United States, the European Community, Canada, and Japan are the
WTO's Big Four members (the
7
9Quad), and 128 other developed and developing countries belong to the
organization.13 The WTO ocially replaced the provisional GAFF body as
administrator of the GAFi' treaty and became administrator of the other WTO
treaties on 1 January 1995 in accord with the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization.'4 The US Congress accepted the agreement on
30 Dec 1994, two days prior to its entry into force.'5
In accordance with their founding principles, the WTO performs three main
functions. The WTO:
(1) facilitates and maximizes free trade between member countries through
removal of trade barriers and requirement of transparent domestic rules;
(2) provides a forum for trade negotiations; and
(3) resolves trade disputes through treaty interpretation.'6
These functions are evident in the structure of the organization, which is
run by its member governments. WTO agreements are interconnected and
clearly directed toward the single goal of maximizing freedom of trade. The
membership as a whole makes major decisions, normally by consensus, either
through ministers at their biannual meetings or
12 The VITO's website is an excellent resource for historical information, docu-
ments, and dispute settlement
reports. Their website is located at <http://www.wto.org>.
13 States become members by signing and enacting the VITO treaties. See WTO,
The Organization:
Membership, Alliances, and Bureaucracy, VITO website (17 July 1997) <http:llwww.wto.orglwto/aboutlorgansn3.htm>.
14 The term GAIT is confusing to most people because of its history. The original
GATT treaty set up a provisional body to conduct oversight of the treaty, which was
simply referred to as GATT on the
assumption that a more permanent body would soon be created. The provisional body,
however, existed from 1947 | 1994, partially due to the failure of the International
Trade Organization (ITO). In modern
parlance, GAiT' refers only to the specic trade agreement signed in 1948, while WTO
refers to the
member organization that administers the GAIT and related trade treaties. WTO
agreements refers to the whole host of treaties administered by the VITO.
' The statutory approval and entry into force of the Uruguay Round Agreements,
including the GAIT, the SPS Agreement, and the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
is located at 19 U.S.C. 53511, Pub.L. 103 -
465, 108 Stat. 4809 (8 Dec 1994).
'6See WTO, What is the World Trade Organization?, VITO website (14 January
1998) <http://www.wto.orgwto/aboutifactsl.htm>.
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10through ocials at their regular Geneva meetings. The WTO's dispute
settlement mechanism, created to fulll the WTO's third function, is unique in
international law.
B. Member Obligations Under the Treaties
The GATT. The most well-known and long-standing agreement that WTO
administers is the GAFF, which currently has 132 signatories. All WTO mem-
bers are contracting parties to the GAFF and, as such, experience four major
substantive obligations in formulating domestic policy. Members must:
(1) grant most-favored-nation (MFN) status to all other WTO members
under Article I, so any trade privileges extended to one member are extended
to all;
(2) aord the same treatment to like products whether domestic or im-
ported (a.k.a. national treatment);
(3) generally eliminate quantitative restrictions under Article XI (e.g., a
zero quota on tropical hardwoods would be inconsistent); and
(4) notify all GAFF members upon the grant or maintenance of any sub-
sidy that directly or indirectly aects trade and discuss limiting it if necessary
in accord with Article XVI.
WTO agreements are not static and may be amended by signatories during
the multiyear negotiations called rounds. WTO member nations most recently
amended the GAFF during the intensive Uruguay Round of negotiations, con-
ducted between 1986-94, and during which members made further commitments
to creating a more level playing eld for trade.
Perhaps the most obvious way to reduce barriers is to eliminate exceptions.
The original GAFF allowed, for instance, some notable exceptions for quotas
and subsidies in
9
11agricultural trade, which will be phased out as a result of the Uruguay
negotiations.'7 The GATT contains some more permanent exceptions, however,
included in the treaty to balance the benets of free trade with Members' under-
standable demands for retained sovereignty. For instance, GAFF Article XXI
recognizes deference to sovereignty in the event of conict between Member
obligations and national security. More relevant to this discussion, however, is
GAFF Article XX, under which Members may maintain measures that would
otherwise be inconsistent with the GAFF so long as they arise from partic-
ular sovereign rights and do not oend basic principles of the GAFF. These
police power-type exceptions generally relate to health, safety and welfare. If
a dispute arises, the complaining member will rst try to establish that the
measure-imposing Member is in violation of one of the GAFF provisions; if suc-
cessful, the measure-imposing Member then tries to defend by showing that the
measure is excepted by Art. XX and the Member is thus acting consistently
with the GAFF after all.'8
For the purposes of this paper, the relevant portions of GAFF Art. XX are
the introductory chapeau, (b), and (g). Article XX provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a man-
ner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
17 See VITO, Summary of the Agreements, VITO website (October 17, 1997)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/about/agmntso.htni>.
18
For example, Member Y might note that the general rule under Art. 111:4 is that
measures may restrict
trade in like products only so long as they do not treat imports less favorably.
Y might then say that Member Z does not subject its domestic like products to an
equivalent, corresponding restriction as
imports. If so, Z is prima facie acting inconsistently with the GAIT. However, Z may
be able to justify its measure by showing that an Art. XX exception applies, in which
case the measure is inconsistent with
Article 111:4 but not inconsistent with the GAIT as a whole.
10
12(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such mea-
sures are made eective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production
or consumption
Article XX(b) is obviously relevant to food safety regulations since they are
precisely intended, as FDA proclaims, to protect pregnant women and children.
Article XX(g) relates to food regulation because food production and harvesting
inherently aects the environment and as a result may implicate conservation,
as I will discuss in Section -C, infra. The chapeau establishes the context of
the exceptions the GAFF as a whole.
Other Agreements. In addition to the GAFF, the WTO administers a
variety of related trade agreements, such as the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (ThT Agreement). These related agreements are
typically understood as elucidating particular aspects or requirements of the
GAFF, but it is important to recognize that they are technically independent of
the GAFF in that they are binding treaties in themselves. The most important
GAFF-related treaty for the purposes of this paper is the SPS Agreement. Its
meaning and relationship to the GAFF are considered at length in the Meat
Hormones reports discussed below.
C. Trade Disputes Between WTO Members
Unlike most international regimes, WTO notably includes a dispute settle-
ment process created under the original GAFF to resolve trade disputes be-
tween member states. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), located in Annex 2 of the GAFF, is the
implementing document of the dispute
11
13settlement body (DSB) and lays out the process of dispute settlement.'9
Figure 1 below provides a ow chart of the dispute settlement process including
timelines and WTO commentary.
Structure of the Dispute Settlement Process, if two or more WTO Members
are engaged in a dispute related to trade measures and cannot successfully
negotiate a settlement amongst themselves within sixty days, either or both
Members may request convention of a WTO panel. The panel considers the
case and issues an ocial report, usually recommending, if appropriate, that
the complaining Member request the oending Member to align their trade
measures with treaty obligations as interpreted by the panel. Any Member
party may appeal the decision to the Appellate Body (AB), a
20
creation of the Uruguay Round. The AB may uphold, overturn, or modify
the panel's
ndings and conclusions of law. The WTO cannot actually force a Member
to alter measures found inconsistent with WTO obligations as interpreted by
the DSB. If a Member refuses to abide by the ndings of a panel and/or the
Appellate Body by 60 days after nal disposition, the oending Member must
submit to arbitration to determine what retaliatory trade measures may be
employed against it until it chooses to act consistently. The inability of WTO
to actually force compliance with its agreements is typical of international law
and should not be construed to indicate weakness on the part of WTO. In fact,
the very existence of the dispute settlement body indicates unique strength.
19 The text of the DSU is available on the VITO's website at <http:/www.wto.orgIwto/dispute/dsu.htn-
iz.. See also Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gov-
erning the Settlement of
Disputes (VIT/DSB/RC/l, adopted 11 December 1996).
20 Working Procedures for Appellate Review, the full text of which is available on the
VITs website at <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/ab3.htni>.
12
14There are several peculiar aspects of the WTO dispute settlement process
that deserve attention before turning to actual disputes. First, panel decisions
are persuasive, not authoritative, so they are not technically binding on future
panels. It does seem unlikely though that a WTO panel in practice would de-
viate wildly from a previous report without justication, especially given the
WTO's dependence on administrative eciency and predictability to maintain
the international legitimacy fundamental to a successful treaty regime. Sec-
ondly, the Appellate Body does not have authority to remand to the original
panel for further consideration once the Appellate Body claries interpretations
of law. This creates interesting challenges for both the panels (who cannot come
back to issues which they do not reach in their considerations) and the Appellate
Body (who relies on the panel to do complete fact-nding in case it is wrong
on a legal interpretation, and who cannot simply clarify law but must apply it).
Finally, the Uruguay round changed the rules for adoption of reports. Previ-
ously, WTO Members had to ocially adopt reports by consensus, providing
an opportunity for nations to block adoption through obstinacy and/or politi-
cal pressure. Under the revised agreement, a report will now be automatically
adopted unless there exists a consensus against its adoption.22
21 For a discussion of the relative usefulness of adopted versus unadopted reports,
see Shrimp Panel Report,
infra note 136, at fns. 623 & 662.
22 See VITO, Settling Disputes: The WTO's Most lndividual Contribution, VITO
website (20 October
1997) <http://www.wto.orgIwto/about1dispute1.htm>.
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17Types or Disputes Relating to Food. Two general categories of food
product-related disputes have occurred to date within the WTO framework.
The typical class of cases are traditional trade disputes in which the import
or export at issue happens to be a food article. Sample trade disputes involv-
ing food articles include complaints led against the EU regarding its ocial
favoritism toward former colonies for purposes of
23
banana importation (WTJDS27), against Brazil for imposition of duties on
desiccated
coconut imports (WTIDS22),24 and against the EU concerning export
subsidies on 25
processed cheese (WT/DS 104/1). The second, rarer class of food disputes
relate to trade
measures that reect policy decisions made and implemented by one WTO
member to advance larger social goals, particularly consumer and environmental
protection, but that impact international trade and that other Members disagree
are warranted. In the context of food regulation, oniy the Meat Hormones,
Tuna, and Shrimp disputes belong to this class at present. In each of these
cases, the WTO dispute settlement body agreed that certain measures could
not be sustained consistently with one or more WTO agreements.
Unlike traditional trade disputes, the Meat Hormones, Tuna, and Shrimp
cases implicate peculiar health, environmental, and philosophical concerns. Gov-
ernments and private citizens are growing more aware of some potential health
concerns associated with new food technologies, as well as some environmental
impacts of modem food production. As a result, relatively advanced govern-
ments like the US and the EU may be inclined to change their laws to reect
these concerns and to accommodate public demand, especially since their strong
economies can likely withstand any resulting
23 See WTO, Overview of the State of Play of WTO Disputes, WI'O website
(23 January 1998)
<http:llwww.wto.orglwto/dispute/bulletin.htm>.
 See id.
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18disruption. Under the WTO agreements, however, unilateral resolution of
the conict between trade interests and other values may not be consistent with
international obligations Environmental and moral considerations which place a
perceived imperative on an individual country to take action before seeking an
international consensus may result in trade sanctions that the measure-imposing
Member considers unjust. To retain legitimacy and voluntary compliance, the
WTO is now struggling with striking the balance between sovereignty and free
trade in the manner most agreeable to Members while still complying with the
letter and spirit of the GAFF and the other WTO
26
agreements. The ability of the WTO to balance these considerations to the
satisfaction
of its sovereign members may determine the ultimate success of the WTO.
Caseload. The GAFF was signed in 1948. The Tuna dispute was brought
before the WTO dispute settlement body over forty years later in 1991. Six
years later, in 1997, a panel convened to consider the Meat Hormones dispute.
Only one year later, Shrimp followed. These issues are obviously not resolved.
Further, the WTO's caseload is notably increasing due to some combination of
expanding world trade, the stricter rules laid down in the Uruguay round, and
improved legitimacy of the WTO process?7 Given the Uruguay round's changes
to the rules regarding panel report adoption, the WTO's generally increasing
caseload, and recent and ever-faster advances in biotechnology, the likelihood of
future cases pressing upon the tension between free trade and sovereignty seems
high. Questions about the role of WTO agreements in formulating domestic
food
25 See id.
26 The treaties themselves reect a rudimentary awareness of these issues. For
instance, the GAIT tries to
reconcile sovereignty with free trade interests in GAIT Art. XX, while the SPS Agree-
ment Art. 3.3 arms sovereign decision-making as well.
16
19policy, and whether the limitations the agreements create are appropriate,
are ripe for discussion and deserve immediate attention.
III. The WTO Treaties and Domestic Food Regulation
A. Case Study. BGH and Scientic Uncertainty
The Meat Hormones case is in some ways a watershed for the WTO Set-
tlement Body, beginning to dene the edges of WTO's legitimacy and its role
in domestic policymaking based on science. The Tuna and Shrimp cases raise
serious questions about the relationship between seemingly conicting policy
commitments, i.e., free trade and protection of sea creatures; however, in con-
trast to the Meat Hormones case, the US animal protection measures at issue in
Tuna and Shrimp clearly accomplished their stated goal of protecting dolphin
and turtle life respectively. In Meat Hormones, the precise issue is whether
a ban on hormone-treated meat in fact protects human life or health at all.
While the Tuna and Shrimp measures were held to violate the GAFF despite
their eectiveness, the WTO found that the Meat Hormones measures were only
consistent with the SPS if they were shown to be eective.
1. The Panel Report (1997)28
In 1981 the EU Council adopted Directive 8 1/602/EEC, a Council Directive
Prohibiting the Use in Livestock Farming of Certain Substances Having a Hor-
monal Action, essentially requiring all EC members to ban the administration
of certain
27
See WTO, Settling Disputes: The WTO's Most Individual Contribution, VITO
website (20 October
1997) <http://www.wto.orgIwto/about1dispute1.htm>.
28 Report of the Panel on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones), 18 August 1997,
1997 VIL 569984 (W.T.O.), VIT/DS26IRIUSA [hereinafter BGH Panel Report].
Since the US led its complaint rst and the complaints are nearly identical in both
substance and disposition, I am using the
17
20hormones to farm animals. The adoption in 1988 of Directive 88/146/EEC
expanded the ban to cover ve additional hormones used to promote growth in
farm animals (with narrow exceptions for therapeutic and zootechnical treat-
ments), as well as requiring member countries to ban importation from third
countries of animals and meat products
29
to which such hormones had been administered. The EU Council conrmed
and
extended the policy directives on 29 April l996.
According to evidence produced during the dispute settlement that ensued,
at the time of the ban only four or ve EC member states allowed any use of
the hormones in question;3' one of these, the United Kingdom, estimated on the
basis of anecdotal evidence that only about 40% of UK meat-producing animals
received any hormone
32
treatment. In contrast, the FDA had already approved use of the three
natural hormones
(estradiol, progesterone, and testosterone) and the three synthetic hormones
(zeranol, trenbolone acetate, and melengestrol acetate (MGA)) for growth pro-
motion purposes?3 The US established during the dispute settlement that an
average of 70% of American beef cattle were being treated with one or more of
the hormones in question by the time the ban entered force.34 Thus, although
the EU directive was facially neutral, applying
VITO panel report on the US complaint (WT/D526). The facts and arguments
apply equally to the companion complaint by Canada however (WTIDS48).
29 See id at 2.3 | 2.4.
30The EU Council replaced the two existing directives with Directive 96/22/EC. See
id. at 2.5.
' See BGH Panel Report at 8.205.
32 See id.
 All six hormones, except MGA, which is supplied as a feed additive, are ad-
ministered through a slow-
release ear implant pellet; the ears are discarded at slaughter. All six hormones remain
available today in the
US as over-the-counter animal drugs approved for administration to beef cattle and
sheep. See FDA Center
for Veterinary Medicine, The Use of Hormone for Growth Promotion in Food-
Producing Animals, May
1996 <http:llwww.cvm.fda.gov/fda/infores/consumer/con I 3.html>. More infor-
mation on the approvals is
available in 21 CFR 6522, 6556, 6558.
 See BGH Panel Report at 8.205. The US noted that trade American beef and veal
exports to the EU was
in the hundreds of millions of dollars between 1986 - 1989 and was increasing at a rate
21of approximately
30% each year, but American imports plummeted to nearly zero after the ban took
eect in 1989. See BGH
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22equally to domestic and imported meat and meat products, the ban in fact
had a disproportionate impact on importers that spurred the US and Canada
to action. Both Members brought WTO complaints against the EU, claiming
that the ban, as it related to six specic hormones administered to cattle for
growth promotion purposes, violated the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement,
and the GAFF.
In response to the US and Canada's allegations, the EU argued that its
measures were justied under the Art. XX(b) exception to the GAFF, which
pertains to the protection of human life or health, and were thus consistent
with all three agreements. After studying the relevant texts, the WTO panel
concluded that the SPS Agreement creates obligations additional to the GAFF
for Members who adopt sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and that nothing
in the WTO agreements required consideration of GAFF consistency prior to
SPS Agreement consistency. The panel found the TBT Agreement inapplicable
because the TBT Agreement specied that it did not apply to
35
sanitary measures. In the interests of administrative eciency, the panel
chose to rst consider whether the EU standards violated the SPS Agreement.36
The SPS Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures
which may, directly or indirectly, aect international trade.37 Such measures
are essentially a subset of measures that qualify for consideration under GAFF
Article XX(b), so measures consistent with the SPS Agreement are presumed
consistent with the GAFF. Parties to the Meat Hormones dispute conceded that
the EU ban constituted sanitary
Panel Report at 4.10. The US introduced retaliatory trade measures on the same
day the ban went into eect. The US eliminated some of the retaliatory measures
following an EC/US agreement to allow
American meat certied as not violating the ban into the EU market. See BGH
Panel Report at 2.35. 13 See BGH Panel Report at 8.29.
36See BGH Panel Report at 8.40 | 8.42.
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23measures and that a ban could aect trade, so the panel concluded that
the SPS Agreement was applicable to the dispute. Under the SPS Agreement,
WTO members agree to enact sanitary and phytosanitary measures that aect
trade only to the extent necessary...based on scientic principles.38 Measures
that conform to international standards are presumed consistent with the SPS
(and GAFF), although the presumption is rebuttable.39 If an international stan-
dard does not exist or is lower than the proposed standard, then the member
country may impose the standard only if it is based on scientic evidence or
a demonstrated risk assessment. SPS Article 5 lays out the risk assessment
process with relevant factors in the assessment including not only health and
environmental concerns (Art. 5.2), but potential economic (Art. 5.3) and trade
(Art. 5.4) impacts as well.
The panel allocated the initial burden of proof to the United States to make
a case against the EU measures that, if unrebutted, would establish a prima
facie violation. Of the six bovine hormones in dispute in the Meat Hormones
case, ve of the steroids had Codex standards at the time of the ban and three
naturally occur in cattle.40 The panel found that the EU's standards for the ve
steroids diered signicantly from the Codex standards and so were not based
on international standards4' and could not be presumed
 SPS Article 1.1.
38 SPS Article 2.2.
 See SPS Articles 3.1 and 3.2.
 See id. at 8.58 & 8.62. The hormone without a Codex standard at the time was
MGA.
'See id. at 8.77. Codex Alimentarius is a joint commission of the United Nations Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization. Created in
1962 to establish voluntary
international food standards, Codex serves as an international resource and is espe-
cially invaluable to
countries that do not have sucient resources to research food safety. The Codex
standards are not binding of themselves, but are practically so with the advent of the
W'1'O. Annex A of the SPS agreement
specically denes international standards as Codex standards, and the BGH panel
found that where
Codex standards exist, Members must follow them or justify not doing so. See BGH
Panel Report at 8.56 |8.57. For information on Codex standards generally, see the
FAO website at <http:nnwww.fao.org>. For
20
24in accord with the SPS Agreement. Once the US established that the EU
standards were not based on international standards, the panel shifted the bur-
den of proof to the EU to justify its measures scientically under Art. 3.3. This
burden of proof assignment to the EU treats SPS Art. 3.3 in the same manner
as a GAFF Art. XX armative defense.42
The panel found both procedural and substantive aws in the EU's stan-
dardsetting, and ultimately struck down the ban as it applied to each of the six
hormones when administered for growth promotion purposes. Procedurally, the
panel concluded that the EU had successfully demonstrated that it did carry
out the necessary risk assessment under SPS Article 5, but believed that the
EU failed to meet a minimum procedural requirement of 5.1 to showing that it
used the risk assessment when creating the measures.43
The substantive failures were more damning though. The panel concluded
that the EU's scientic conclusion about the danger of BGH, as reected in
the measure, had no basis in any of the evidence referenced by the EU, and
thereby exceeded international standards in violation of Art. 3.1 without any
Art. 3.3 justication. Further, the panel concluded that the measures, even if
the EU had proved them scientically justied, also failed to meet the other
requirements of the SPS Agreement. In this regard, the panel found that the
measures violated Art. 5.5 because of the EU's dierent treatment of hormones
in comparable situations, which created arbitrary distinctions and resulted in
information on the use of Codex standards in WTO disputes, see generally BGH
Panel Report at 8.66 et seq.
42See BGH Panel Report at 8.50 | 8.55; see also Figure 2, infra.
 BGH Panel Report at 8.114|8.116.
See id. at 8.134 & 8.137.
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25discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade.45 Specically of concern to
the panel was the EU's dierential treatment of (1) endogenous hormones and
hormones administered for therapeutic and zootechnical purposes compared to
natural hormones administered for growth promotion purposes, (2) natural hor-
mones compared to synthetic hormones, and (3) all disputed hormones compared
to the anti-microbial growth promoter carbadox.46 This SPS interpretation is
complementary in principle to the GAFF's Art. 111:4 provision on process
distinctions|Art. 111:4 requires that Members treat like
products alike and does not allow trade distinctions between nal commercial
products
47
based on their process or production methods (PPM) in manufacture. In
this case,
interpreting SPS, the panel concluded that the EU, by not placing any limit
on levels of the naturally occurring hormones in meat, was tacitly admitting
that they were safe at their natural levels. The EU' s zero tolerance policy for
administered hormones, which cannot be dierentiated from exogenous ones in
the cattle's bodies, thus eectively created an arbitrary process distinction.
Figure 2 below summarizes the BGH panel's interpretation of the appropri-
ate method of determining whether measures are consistent or inconsistent with
the SPS Agreement. Note that the panel's allocation of burden of proof is also
indicated.
See id. at 8.213.
46 See id. at 8.185.
Examples of process and production method (PPM) distinctions include whether
plastic is recycled,
whether wood comes from tropical or temperate forests, whether timber is sus-
tainably cut, whether gas is formulated for reduced emissions, etc. The dierence
between PPMs that are reected in the nal product and those that are not is critical
for purposes of the TBT Agreement and its labeling standards. The TBT does not
apply to sanitary measures though.
22
262.3
Fa3ia.r&i. BGH Panel's Interpretation of the SPS Agreement.
Does the measure constitute a sanitary measure?
[Burden ofproof on complainant]
IYES
Do international standards exist?
[Burden ofproof on complainant]
IYBS
Is measure based on international standards?
[Burden ofproof on complainant]
t
YES, or less strict
Presumed consistent
With SPS
NOJ,
SPS inapplicable
NO
if
Is measure based on scientic
evidence or a demonstrated
risk assessment?
(procedural & substantive inquiry)
[Burden ofproofshs to and remains with respondent]
NOJ,
NO, stricter
Has the member adopted dif-
ferent Levels of protection in sit-
uations where the same substance
or the same adverse
Inconsistent
with SPS
health impact is involved?
IYES
Is the distinction in level of pro-
tection arbitrary or
unjustiable?
tYES
Does the distinction result in
discrimination or a disguised re-
striction on international trade?
4YES
Inconsistent
with SPS
N04,
Consistent with SPS
NO
Consistent with SPS
N04,
27Are measures more restrictive
than necessary to provide ade-
quate protection?
YES
NO4,
Inconsistent with SPS
Consistent with SPS
28Since the decision was appealed, detailed consideration of the panel's nd-
ings is inappropriate here. However, the BGH panel report raised a number
of important questions about scientic uncertainty, the precautionary principle,
and consumer information. Two particular elements of the Report are worth
noting in some detail, especially since the Appellate Body addresses them as
well: (1) the panel's discussion of the dierence between risk assessment, as the
term is used in SPS Art. 5, and the concept of risk management; and (2) the
panel's indication, or lack thereof, of what would constitute, for WTO purposes,
adequate scientic justication to allow deviance from international standards
in the face of scientic uncertainty.
Risk Assessment vs. Risk Management. In interpreting the obliga-
tions that arise under the SPS Agreement, the BGH panel distinguishes the
risk assessment function (a scientic assessment of available data) from the
risk management function (a political process by which science becomes pol-
icy by way of social judgments).48 The SPS Agreement requires that Members
base their sanitary measures on risk assessments, which the panel interpreted
as meaning that the Member should rst conduct a risk assessment to deter-
mine the actual risks to human health that a substance poses, if any. Once
some risk is so established, the panel goes on to state, a proper risk assessment
also requires an evaluation of the potential or probability of occurrence of these
eects.AY The Member then moves to the second phase|the political pro-
cess of risk management|to establish an appropriate level of protection and
determine how to act
4tSee BGH Panel Report at 8.91 et seq.
 See id. at 8.98. The latter requirement moves the risk assessment closer to
a quantitative cost-benet analysis. See footnote 76, infra, and accompanying text
regarding the Appellate Body's treatment of this characterization.
24
29See BGH Panel Report at 8.160.
on the now-available scientic information. The panel characterizes the pro-
cess as follows:
Once the risks have been assessed, i.e., once the risks and their probability
of occurrence identied, a Member will need to decide, on the basis of its own
value judgments, whether it can accept these risks. In so doing a Member sets
its appropriate level of sanitary protection. The determination and application
of the appropriate level of protection by a Member is part of risk management.50
SPS Articles 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 particularly relate to risk management. The
rst sets the minimization of negative trade impacts as a general goal, the
second requires some degree of internal consistency in making risk management
decisions (i.e. considers the Member's treatment of comparable risks that may or
may not be subjects of the dispute), and the third forces Members to choose the
least trade-restrictive means of implementing their risk management decision.
Note that Figure 2 above reects the panel's understanding of the relationship
between the risk assessment-risk management process and Member obligations
under the SPS Agreement.
Sucient Scientic Evidence. The question naturally arises upon reading
the panel report: how much scientic evidence does a Member need to justify a
policy decision under SPS Art. 3.3. Clearly an international scientic consensus,
usually in the form of a Codex standard, is not necessary or there would be no
point to SPS Art. 3.3, which allows the application of measures that do not
conform to international standards but are nonetheless scientically justied.
The panel's interpretation of the sucient
25
30scientic evidence language in that provision is admittedly limited by the
facts of the case. The panel summarizes:
[W]e recall that all scientic experts advising the Panel.., stated that, as of
today, no scientic evidence is available which concludes that an identiable
risk arises from the use of any of the hormones at issue for growth promotion
purposes in accordance with good practice.... In our view, the scientic con-
clusion reected in the EU measures in dispute...does not conform to any of
the scientic conclusions reached in the evidence referred to by the European
Communities.51 (emphasis added)
While the panel attempted to parse out the relative functions of risk as-
sessment and risk management, both in general and in the WTO context, it
fails to reach the more interesting and challenging question of what constitutes
sucient scientic evidence since it has an easy case in this regard, i.e., no evi-
dence. Footnote 2 of the Agreement merely refers to justication being based on
an examination and evaluation of available scientic information in conformity
with the relevant provisions of this Agreement. This language is not particu-
larly enlightening. Further, neither the treaty language nor the anel directly
address how conicting scientic evidence should be weighed|with deference
to the WTO member, or with de novo review by a WTO panel. Since the lat-
ter questions are really the ones of interest to the EU as it pursues scientic
evidence in its favor, it is fortunate that the Appellate Body gave some better
guidance.
2. Appellate Body Report (1998)52
The EU appealed the panel decision. The Appellate Body (AB) armed
the panel's principle holding that the EU ban is inconsistent with SPS Art. 5.1.
However, the
' See BGH Panel Report at 8.134 | 8.137.
52 Report of the Appellate Body on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), 16
January 1998, 1998 VIL 25520 (W.T.O.), WT/D526/ABIR [hereinafter BGH Ap-
pellate Report].
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31AB also made a number of other relevant ndings, particularly important
for predicting how the WTO dispute settlement body will review questions
involving scientic uncertainty in the future.53 One such critical holding relates
to the panel's ndings under Art. 5.5. The panel found that the following
aspects of the EU measures were in themselves arbitrary or unjustiable: (1)
the treatment of endogenous hormones compared to added hormones,54 and
(2) the treatment of hormones administered for therapeutic and zootechnical
purposes compared to hormones administered for growth promotion purposes.55
In this context, the AB made the important precedential statement:
[W]e consider there is a fundamental distinction between added hormones
(natural or synthetic) and naturally-occurring hormones in meat and other
foods.56
The following table summarizes the ndings of the AR, not all of which are
raised in this discussion.57
igure 3. Summary of Findings of the BGH Appellate Body.
Panel Appellate Body
(EC challenge that the Panel did not ob-
jectively assess the facts of the case as ob-
ligated by DSU Art. 11.)
Panel acted properly.
(EC challenge to several procedural meth-
ods adopted by the panel, including its se-
lection and use of experts.)
Panel acted properly.
(US and Canadian challenge to panel's fail-
ure to make ndings regarding Art. 2.2.
and Art. 5.6.)
Panel exercised appropriate ju-
dicial economy.
Standard of review. Upheld.
The precautionary principle cannot over-
ride Arts. 5.1 and 5.3 but is incorporated
into Art. 5.7.
Upheld.
Despite the fact that the AR upheld the panel's decision on the ban, many people
recognized the potential
import of the appellate decision. See, e.g., WTO Ruling on EU Hormone Ban is
a Victory for European
Consumers, RAPID Press Release (16 January 1998).
' See BGH Panel Report at 221
See id. at 225.
56 See id. at 221.
' See id. at 253.
27
32The SPS Agreement applies to measures
enacted prior to its entry into force that
remain in force thereafter.
Upheld.
A measure must comply with Art. 5 to be
consistent with Art. 3.3.
Upheld.
Assignment of burden of proof. Reversed.
The meaning of "based on international
standards in Art. 3.1 and Art. 3.3.
Reversed.
The EU ban is inconsistent with Art. 3.1. Reversed.
Being based on a risk assessment entails a
minimum procedural requirement.
Reversed.
Interpretation of risk assessment. Modied.
Findings and conclusions on Art. 5.1. Modied.
Findings and conclusions on Art. 5.5. Reversed.
The Appellate Body's interpretation of the meaning of based on and their
assignment of burdens of proof are critical reversals. First, the AR claries that
having measures based on international standards, within the meaning of Arts.
3.1 and 3.3, is dierent than having measures that conform to international
standards, within the meaning of Art. 3.2. While confonning measures enjoy
a rebuttable presumption of consistency with the SPS Agreement under Art.
2.4, a Member can adopt measures more loosely based on the international
standards, which are still consistent with Art. 3.1 58 The AR also concludes
that the panel must have misconceived the relationship between Articles 3.1,
3.2, and 3.3 of the SPS because Art. 3.3 is not an exception to Art. 3.1 in the
sense that Art. XX is to the other provisions of the GAFF.59 Under the AR's
interpretation, the initial burden of proof is on the complainant to show each
element of inconsistency with the SPS Agreement, including inconsistency with
Art. 3.3, rather than shifting to the respondent to prove consistency with Art.
3.3 by means of a scientic
58 See id. at 177.
 Due to their interpretation, the AB later reverses the panel's conclusion that
the EU acted inconsistently
with Art. 3.1 by acting inconsistently with Art. 3.3. Since there is not a general
rule-exception relationship
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33justication for not basing the measures on international standards. The
AR's interpretation of based on and their assignment of the burden of proof
recharacterizes the burdens of the parties in such dispute. The interpretation
of based on also rearms the sovereign right of states to establish their own
appropriate levels of consumer
60
protection through sanitary measures.
The AR also addresses the important issue of standard of review that the
panel failed to adequately address. The EU contested the panel's lack of def-
erence to its scientic assessment and risk management decisions regarding the
six hormones, arguing that a deferential reasonableness rather than de novo
standard is appropriate.6' After noting that neither the SPS Agreement nor the
DSU provide a specic standard of review for SPS matters, the AR goes on to
say that DSU Art. 11 does articulate[] with great succinctness but with suf-
cient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both
the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the
relevant agreements.62 That standard is neither totally deferential nor de novo,
according to the AR, but rather calls for an objective assessment of the facts.63
Several guidelines emerge from the AR's discussion of the EU's complaints
that the panel's actual assessment of the scientic evidence in this dispute was
not objective. These basic guidelines are at least worth noting here:
between the two articles, inconsistency with the one does not itself create incon-
sistency with the other. See
id. at 157.
 See id. at 108 | 109; see also id. at 172 (referring to the right to set
appropriate levels as an important
right and an autonomous right...not an exception from a general obligation under
Art. 3.1). For a look at
how the DSB has comparatively interpreted the GAIT exceptions, see, e.g., Shrimp
Panel Report, infra
note 136, at 7.40. Given the nearly identical introductory language of the two provi-
sions, the AB's
distinction in Meat Hormones is somewhat slippery.
61 See id. at 100|119.
62 Id. at 116.
63 Id. at 117.
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34(1) Panels do not have an obligation to gather or request submission of sci-
entic data.M
(2) Panels may utilize scientic experts as it deems appropriate and best
suited to
the dispute at hand, e.g. requesting a range of opinions from individual
experts
rather than establishing an expert panel to provide a consensus opinion.65
(3) Panels should not disregard scientic evidence oered by a party, but
may
66
conclude that it is not relevant in nature. In the same vein, a panel may
distinguish between general scientic evidence relating to a substance (e.g., one
hormone) and specic scientic evidence regarding application (e.g., residues
of that hormone in meat after administration to cattle for growth promotion
purposes).67
(4) Panels generally has discretion in deciding which evidence to utilize in
making
its ndings.68
(5) A single divergent scientic view is not per se reasonably sucient to
69
outweigh contrary scientic information.
(6) Harmless error does not invalidate a panel's ndings.70
These guidelines provide some guidance to future panels regarding the han-
dling of scientic evidence, as well as alerting future parties to panels' obligations
in handling scientic evidence.
 See id. at 136.
65Seeid. at 146| 147.
See id. at 137.
67Seeid. at 141.
68 See id. at 135.
69 See id. at 198.
70 See id. at 138.
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35The AR further claries the demands of scientic justication in its con-
sideration of the precautionary principle, its interpretation of Art. 5.1, and
its discussion of the nature of a risk assessment. Together, these elements of
the AR Report provide much greater exibility to nation states in conducting
risk assessments and making risk management decisions. I will discuss each
respectively.
While passing on the question of whether the precautionary principle is now
a general principle of international law (referring to it as an important, but ab-
stract, question),7' the AR does address the role of the precautionary principle
in assessing a Member's compliance with the SPS Agreement. The AR upheld
the panel's conclusion that the principle could not override explicit obligations
arising from the SPS Agreement, given that it had not been incorporated into
the SPS Agreement as a justication for maintaining otherwise inconsistent
measures. Indeed, it seems logical that such a general holding would undermine
the purpose of the Agreement, especially given the diculty of proving that
the precautionary principle was the motivating factor behind a policy decision.
However, the AR continued, stating: We agree, at the same time, with the Eu-
ropean Communities, that there is no need to assume that Article 5.7 exhausts
the
72
relevance of a precautionary principle. According to the AR's interpretation,
the SPS
' Id. at 123.
72 Id. at 124. Article 5.7 relates to provisional measures adopted by Members in
the face of insucient
scientic evidence. The Member may only adopt such measures provisionally and
must seek additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and
review the sanitary or phytosanitary
measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time. The EU stated that their
measures are not
provisional, so the panel did not apply Art. 5.7. But what if the EU mistook the mean-
ing of provisional? It is unclear what constitutes provisional measures or a reasonable
period of time. At rst it seems
unlikely that a Member could just adopt measures without sucient scientic
evidence until there is sucient evidence, even if they kept reviewing the science at
reasonable time intervals. But the text is intriguing since it allows such adoption on
the basis of available pertinent information, and the
reasonable period of time language seems to only refer specically to the requirement
that the Member seek more evidence and review the measure accordingly. If no more
conclusive evidence comes in for an
31
36Agreement explicitly recognizes the sovereign right of Members to establish
their own appropriate level of sanitary protection, which may be higher (i.e.,
more cautious) than that implied in existing international [standards]  Further,
the AR takes the important step of specically addressing one element of how
a panel should evaluate the suciency of scientic evidence:
[A] panel charged with determining, for instance, whether sucient scientic
evidence exists to warrant the maintenance by a Member of a particular SPS
measure may, of course, and should, bear in mind that responsible, representa-
tive governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence and precaution
where risks of irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, damage to human health are
concerned.7 (emphasis added)
This mandate to panels is potentially much more exible and responsive to
reality
than the BGH panel's approach.
The AR' s conclusions as to Art. 5.1. complement their comments on the
precautionary principle. The AR concludes that Article 5.1, read properly in
conjunction with Art. 2.2, requires that the risk assessment reasonably sup-
port the SPS measure in dispute. However, the AR explicitly states that the
risk assessment can properly reect divergent scientic views and uncertainty
rather than coming to a monolithic conclusion that coincides with the scientic
conclusion or view implicit in the SPS measure.75
Lastly, the AR disagreed with the panel on what it saw as the introduction
of a required quantitative element into the risk assessment. The AR felt this
quantitative element arose from the panel's language regarding the second step
of a Member's risk
unreasonable amount of time, despite the Member's eorts, can the Member's
measures still be considered
provisional and therefore consistent with the SPS Agreement? It would have been
interesting to how the
dispute settlement body interprets Art. 5.7 if the EU had not eectively dismissed
this potential argument.
 Id. at 124.
 Id.
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37assessment|that the Member should evaluate the potential or probability of
occurrence
76
of such eects (emphasis added). The AR explains: Neither Articles 5.1 and
5.2 nor Annex A.4 of the SPS Agreement require a risk assessment to establish
a minimum
quantiable magnitude of risk.77 Rather, the AR explicitly states that con-
sideration of non-qualitative factors is entirely appropriate and that the panel
was in error to the extent it relied purely on matters susceptible of quantitative
analysis by the empirical or
78
experimental laboratory methods commonly associated with the physical
sciences. In
sum, the AR explains:
It is essential to bear in mind that the risk that is to be ascertained in a risk
assessment under Article 5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory
operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in human societies
as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for adverse eects on
human health in the real world where people live and work and die.79
3. Other Applications of the SPS Agreement
Despite the fact that the Appellate Body's interpretation of the SPS Agree-
ment is more exible than the BGH panel's was, and even though the exact
nature of scientic evidence to support sanitary measures is still unclear, it is
clear that SPS members must pass some minimum scientic threshold for their
measures to be consistent with the SPS Agreement. Any number of existing
national regulations might be aected by this requirement. Some US laws were
actually changed in deference to Uruguay round conclusions, but these changes
were mainly modications and only a few directly impact
751d. at 194.
761d at 184; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
 BGH Appellate Report at 253(j).
781d. at 187.
 Id.
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food. Examples of food laws which could come under WTO scrutiny include
the FDA's
food denitions and standards of identity,8' lth standards,82 and good manu-
facturing
t0See generally Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 4 (listing mod-
ications to current US laws believed necessary for full compliance with the VITO
agreements in light of the results of the Uruguay round negotiations).
81 Denitions and standards are promulgated pursuant to FFDCA 6341. For an
argument that this is the area of US food law most ripe for dispute in the WTO,
see John S. Eldred & Shirley A. Coeld, What Every Food Manufacturer Needs to
Know: Realizing the Impact of Globalization on National Food Regulation, 52 Food &
Drug L.J. 31, 36(1997).
82  have not seen this issue raised by other commentators, so I will explore it a bit.
Section 342(a)(3) of the FFDCA provides that a food shall be deemed adulterated...
[i]f it consists in whole or in part of any lthy, putrid, or decomposed substance, or
if it is otherwise unt for food. The courts have almost unanimously interpreted
lthy, putrid, or decomposed as independent of unt for food, although the extreme
harshness of this interpretation is tempered in practice by the administrative toler-
ances observed by the FDA during enforcement. See US v. 484 Bags, More or Less,
423 F.2d 839 (5 Cir. 1970); see also US v. 1,5000 Cases...Tomato Paste, 236 F.2d
208 (7k Cir. 1956). Introduction into interstate commerce of an adulterated food is a
prohibited act under FFDCA 6331, which can result in the seizure of the food under
6 334, and in civil or criminal penalties under 6333.
The lth regulations are arguably based solely on an amorphous consumer gross-
out factor; the FDA admits they are not based on food safety concerns. See Natural
or Unavoidable Defects in Food for Human Use that Present No Health Hazard, 37
Federal Register 6497 (30 March 1972) (stating that lth in excess of administrative
tolerance render[s] the product adulterated, even though no health hazard is presented
(emphasis added)). As such, the lth standards are not subject to the SPS Agreement
nor do they qualify under GAIT Art. XX(b). Given the courts' interpretation, it
seems unlikely that the standards are consistent with the GAIT. The rst question
is whether not lthy and lthy products are like under Art. 111:4. The US would
argue that a domestic X-rat hair candy bar is treated the same as an imported X-rat
hair candy bar (allowed), and that a domestic X+ 1-rat hair candy bar is treated
the same as an imported X+ 1-rat hair candy bar (illegal). A complainant would
counter-argue that a domestic X-rat hair candy bar is treated more favorably (legal)
than an imported X+l-rat hair candy bar (illegal), on the argument that the Xrat hair
candy bar and the X+1 rat hair candy bar are like products. Without going into the
complexities of GAIT like product analysis over the years, I merely note that, given
that the candy bars compete directly in the market and are literally indistinguishable
to consumers as to lth content (barring an extreme circumstance likely far in excess of
both the technically zero statutory tolerance and the administrative tolerance level),
this argument seems persuasive. In its extreme, the lth standards would actually
allow no food onto the market, in which case they are equally restrictive to domestic
39goods and imports. In practice, however, they may discriminate against foreign
producers who cannot live up to American sanitary requirements. Alternately, not
allowing lthy candy bars may constitute an Art. XI quantitative restriction without
Art. XX(b) justication.
In practice, the question is probably academic. The US could likely justify some level
of lth regulation (e.g., the administrative tolerances) on the grounds that lth may
indicate an increased likelihood of the presence of other contaminants, even if the
language of the statute needed to be reinterpreted to incorporate otherwise unt for
food into the meaning of lthy. (Of course, that would likely bring the standards
within the scope of the SPS Agreement!) But it seems highly unlikely that any nation
will publicly demand in an international forum the right to import lthy food|a
public relations nightmare| even if individual defendants to FDA actions would like
to raise the defense. The fairness of this situation to importers is dicult to evaluate
objectively given the diculty of making objective policy decisions about the lth
content of the foods that the policy-maker consumes along with everyone else.
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40process (GMP) standards83; and the EU's laws pertaining to genetically
modied
84
organisms (GMOs). In this section, however, I would like to focus on one
rather infamous US food law to consider the potential application of the SPS
Agreement: the
Delaney Clause. This law is only one example|the real eects of WTO deci-
sions on US policymakers and the market will largely depend on what measures
are actually challenged before the WTO dispute settlement body.
The SPS Agreement. The BGH panel held, and the Appellate Body upheld,
that measures taken prior to the SPS Agreement's entry into force, but which
remain in place after its entry into force, are subject to the requirements of
the Agreement. SPS Annex A. 1(b) denes sanitary measures as including any
measure applied to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of
the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-
causing organisms in foods, beverages or
83 Good manufacturing process is a blatant process distinction. I can only
think of two reasons why it
stands: (1) The statutory provision specically applies to goods that appear to
be contaminated (as a result of process) based solely on the examination of such
samples. (The statutory language by examination or otherwise has no real meaning
in conjunction with the word appears). This physical inspection-based standard may
narrowly avoid the process problem. In fact, the statutory language almost invalidates
the process aspect, so long as the product is not adulterated. (2) No one has chal-
lenged it. Arguing for the right to export food produced under unsanitary conditions
is sensitive from a public relations, if not political, standpoint. To the extent that
only foods that appear contaminated can be rejected by FDA, the economic losses to
importers may not be excessively high anyway.
 A dispute actively brewing right now between the US and EU on this issue is strik-
ingly similar to the Meat Hormones dispute. Genetically modied organisms like root
worm-resistant corn and soybeans impervious to pesticides, which are already be-
ing marketed by US companies, have raised signicant political opposition in some
parts of the EU. Commission Directive 90/220/EEC (8 May 1990) requires compul-
sory labelling of products containing or consisting of GMOs, with directed adoption
by individual countries due in 1997. See European Commission, Press Release on
GMO Labeling (IP/97/528) (18 June 1997); Edmund L. Andrews, Europe's Banning
of Treated Beef is Ruled Illegal, Boon for US Industry, New York Times (9 May
1997). The US has responded severely to the EU's actions. US Trade Representa-
tive Charlene Barshefsy said, We made it clear to [the EU] that at a minimum, at a
minimum, were our exports being restricted, we would use VITO dispute settlement.
But that is the minimum. See Barshefsky Warns EU of Trade War Over Genetically
Moded Products, 15 Inside US Trade 16 (20 June 1997). For a general discus-
sion of GMOs and trade issues, see Thomas P. Redick, Biotechnology, Biosafety, and
Sustainable Development, 12 Nat. Resources & Env't. 114 (Fall 1997) (discussing
GMOs).
41US Sen. Richard Lugar (R-In), Chairman of the US Senate Committee on
Agriculture, went so far as to indicate that the EU needs to get over its hang-up
about GMOs. See id. Unless Sen. Lugar is a scientist or
35
42particularly well-informed for a senator, this kind of comment seems highly inappro-
priate and blatantly protrade (at least when the exporter is the US).
85 Peter Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Mate-
rials, 2' ed. (1991), at 868.
feedstus. Footnote 4 further denes contaminants to include pesticide and
veterinary drug residues and extraneous matter. Since the WTO dispute set-
tlement body concluded that the imposes obligations additional to the GAFF,
it can be considered alone.
The Delaney Clause. Arising from consumer concern about increased cancer
rates in the previous two decades, Congress enacted the Delaney Clause in 1958,
creating what one casebook on the subject refers to as one of the most notorious
and least frequently invoked passages in the FD&C Act.85 FFDCA 6348(c)(3),
commonly known as the Delaney Clause for food additives, disallows FDA ap-
proval of any food additive as safe that has been found in human or animal
tests to be carcinogenic, unless GRAS or a prior sanction. This standard is con-
sidered unduly strict by some economists, commentators, and food regulators,
and it eectively preempts the FDA's authority to make determinations about
food safety on this matter. Ironically, the rst notable invocation of the Clause
related to an FDA ban on diethylstilbestrol (DES) use in animals, the same
issue which triggered the EU concern about food additives that eventually led
to their ban on bovine growth hormones.86
The Delaney Clause might be quite vulnerable to an SPS attack on the
grounds that, at least as applied to some additives, it bans products without
sucient scientic justication. The Clause does require that there be at least
one human or animal study that concludes the substance is a carcinogen. How-
ever, while the FDA may make reasonable judgments in applying the law, the
Delaney Clause technically does not require consideration of the scientic merit
of the study or studies, let alone require
36
43international agreement on carcinogenicity, or speak to the degree of scien-
tic uncertainty about the substance's risks. Few scientic studies denitively
conclude anything, especially standing alone.
Assuming that the Delaney Clause is not based on international standards
(in which case it would be prima facie consistent with the SPS Agreement),
there are nonetheless a few facts that at least reduce the likelihood of a WTO
challenge. First, many common substances are GRAS or subject to a prior
sanction. Further, the law came into eect in 1958, almost four decades prior to
the SPS Agreement, so many foreign producers/importers have likely already
adapted to it regarding non-exempted substances.87 Secondly, the Clause was
recently amended in regards to pesticide residues in processed foods, probably
the area of most concern to producers and importers.88
Nonetheless, the Delaney Clause seems apt for challenge after Meat Hor-
mones, especially since there are many natural carcinogens in food which, ar-
guably, the US is arbitrarily distinguishing from added carcinogens. Certainly,
the Delaney Clauses as they relate to certain substances could be challenged
as not based on scientic evidence. The larger question is whether the Clauses
could be challenged as a whole. In fact, although neither the BGH panel nor
AR commented on the record, the EU actually compared their meat hormones
ban to the Delaney Clause several times in their arguments before the WTO.
The EU argued that the Delaney Clause was a perfect example of an inexible,
86 See BGH Panel Report at 2.26.
87 Importantly, this hypothesis may be less true of many growing markets, including
developing countries.
88 For a discussion of the eects of the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 on the
Delaney Clause as it
relates to pesticide residues, see generally James S. Turner, Delaney Lives! Reports
of Delaney's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated!, 28 ELR 10003 (January 1998).
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44zero-tolerance policy.89 The EU also noted that the US had specically in-
terpreted the SPS Agreement, in its Statement of Administrative Action, as
allowing W'I'O members to set zero-risk levels of protection that cannot be
challenged by the WTO, with only the measures used to achieve those levels of
protection open to challenge.
The US Statement of Administrative Action states:
[T]he Delaney Clauses, in the rst instance, establish a level of protection.
They reect a decision by Congress that there should be no risk of cancer to
humans from the substances those clauses cover... .A determination that a
particular food additive poses a health risk is made on scientic grounds....Based
on scientic principles, the United States has determined that if a substance
induces cancer in animals, it poses some risk of human carcinogenesis. And
since the level of protection under Delaney requires that there be zero risk of
carcinogenesis, the [US] prohibitls] the substance. (emphasis added)
The US's distinction between levels of protection and methods of achieving
those levels is supported by the DSB's interpretation of the SPS Agreement. In
the emphasized part of the quote, however, the US seems to draw a problem-
atically ne line|it does not explain why the US can behave dierently as to
the substances the legislation does and does not cover. This shortcoming goes
directly to the issue of national consistency, which the US used against the EU
in the Meat Hormones dispute, pointing to carbadox. Further, the US's decision
to extrapolate from animal to human data may seem perfectly logical, but if
an international consensus does not exist as to this methodology, or if it breaks
down in the future,
895ee BGH Panel Report at 4.124.
 Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 4, at 94 | 95.
38
45then the Clauses as a whole are theoretically based on unsound scientic
principles for SPS purposes.9'
B. Scientic Uncertainty and Food Policy within the US
Issues like those raised in Meat Hormones, particularly scientic uncertainty,
are obviously not purely international concerns. As seen in Meat Hormones, the
WTO framework raises questions about the sovereignty of nation states and the
limitations on government responsiveness to consumer demand. Cases in which
individual states in the US attempt to regulate foods more strictly than the
FDA or USDA raise similar questions.92
Cancer is an excellent example of a phenomenon the causes of which are sci-
entically uncertain. The evaluation of whether substances are carcinogenic, or
helpful in preventing cancer of one type or another, has occupied many Amer-
ican laboratory hours. In a world of such imperfect information, governments
must decide how much safety they want to try to guarantee their citizens. At
the same time, citizen consumers can make food choices, among the foods the
government permits, based on their own beliefs about what foods are good or
bad for them and in what combinations. Inevitably, citizens
91 People in the US who believe the Delaney Clause is too strict might welcome
a successful VITO
challenge that might force Congress to leave carcinogenic risk assessment in the
hands of the expert agency they themselves created precisely to develop expertise
on such matters, the FDA. On the other hand, cancer is a very politically hot topic
among consumers in the US, so the government would likely stand rm even in
the face of a negative W'I'O holding, much like the EU has done regarding meat
hormones. Plus, the US never likes to lose generally.
92 The status of political subdivisions under the VITO agreements is, not surprisingly,
fairly unsympathetic to domestic politics. A panel concluded in 1992 that the US had
not demonstrated that its federal
constitutional structure prevented it from removing trade restrictive measures imposed
by individual states. See Report of the Panel on US Measures Aecting Alcoholic and
Malt Beverages, 16 March 1992, 1992
VIL 799397 (G.A.T.T.), D523/R | 39S/206, at 5.78 |5.80. Although a detailed
analysis of the possibility is beyond the scope of this paper, the interpretation at least
suggests that the GAIT could potentially be more restrictive on states than the US
Dormant Commerce Clause. The US created the position of WTO
Coordinator for State Matters under the US Trade Representative to deal with such
issues. See Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 4.
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46sometimes want the government to do more to protect them. Sometimes
they also want more information, perhaps in the form of labels, so that they
can protect themselves by avoiding certain foods or additives based on their own,
more or less informed, evaluations of the evidence. Several debates relating to
scientic uncertainty have raged in the US in recent years. I will touch on just
two of them|pesticides and bovine somatotropin (growth hormone) residues in
dairy products.
Pesticides. Recently, pesticides have come under increasing scrutiny in
terms of both the risks they pose to children and other sensitive populations,
as opposed to the average healthy adult in a scientic study. The cumulative
risks of exposure to multiple pesticides and sources in an aggregate diet, as
well as over the course of a lifetime, are also debated both within the scientic
community and between industry and consumer advocates.
In the US, EPA is responsible for assessing the toxicity of individual pes-
ticides, while FDA monitors foods for pesticide residues. Pesticides are pri-
marily regulated under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA). FIFRA explicitly preempts some pesticide regulation by individual
states, including imposition of additional labeling requirements.93 Thus, most
US pesticide policy is made at the federal level.9 One recent policy shift is
evident in the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996,
 FIFRA provides in 7 U.S.C. 6136v(b): Uniformity. Such State shall not
impose or continue in eect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to
or dierent from those required under this subchapter.
 This is not to say that the states do not maintain interest in the subject. The
Massachusetts state legislature is currently taking a national lead on pesticides by
considering a bill (Ma. Senate Bill 1970) that would
require manufacturers to provide information on toxic content in products, including
pesticide residues on foods above a certain threshold. FIFRA preemption necessarily
limits the scope of the pesticide aspect of the bill, but it appears that the residue
threshold for providing information could be lower than EPA's
current threshold for labeling as long as the bill does not technically require labeling.
Case law suggests that information could be provided near the product but could not
be required directly on it. Conversation with Paul Burns, MASSPIRG Toxics Division,
29 January 1998. The legislation is currently in the
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47which creates new standards for pesticide residues. The Act forges a single
standard for raw and processed foods (resolving the so-called Delaney paradox
regarding pesticides), bases risk assessments on children rather than adults, and
requires large retail grocers to provide brochures that identify pesticide risks and
ways to avoid exposure.95 The nal element of the Act resounds to the clamor
of consumer advocates for right-to-know information about residues on the food
they buy so that they can make choices about the chemicals to which they may
otherwise unknowingly expose themselves.
Given the strength of the pesticide industry in the US, it seems unlikely that
extremely precautionary measures would suddenly be adopted by Congress, un-
less consumer demand was extraordinarily high. If such an event occurred, de-
spite the Appellate Body's adoption in Meat Hormones of a relatively tolerant
approach to conservative risk assessment, it seems clear that purely consumer
demand-driven legislation would not meet the scientic threshold of the SPS
Agreement, unless it was fortuitously backed by hard (or at least rm) science.
Again though, it appears unlikely in the present political climate that sucient
evidence would accrue to overrule the objections of the US pesticide industry
without meeting the threshold of sucient scientic evidence in the SPS Agree-
ment.
The more germane question then is the SPS as it relates to current pesticide
regulation. Some evidence suggests that a signicant number of modern US
standards exceed international standards and so are open to challenge in the
WTO. One
Massachusetts Senate Ways and Means Committee, having successfully passed out
of the Natural Resources Committee.
 See Lynn R. Goldman, M.D., The Food Quality Protection Act Of 1996: New
Directions In Public Health Protection, US EPA Oce of Pesticide Programs website
(September 1996)
<http://www.epa.gov/oppfeadl/fqpa/sphgoldl.htm>.
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48Government Accounting Oce study noted that, among American pesticide
standards it
96
reviewed, 55% were more protective than existing Codex standards. A study
published in 1994 by the Environmental Working Group and Public Citizen
concluded that the US
barred 1,539 of the 3,285 pesticide/crop combinations for which Codex had
standards at the time and banned residues of 40 pesticides for which Codex had
569 dierent standards at the time (including eight ranked as highiy hazardous
by the WHO, for which Codex had 116 standards).97 While the fact that this
report was released prior to recent pesticide-related amendments to the Delaney
Clause should be taken into account, it is nonetheless at least eye-catching
that the report concludes that the adoption of existing Codex standards for
pesticide/food combinations would result in a twelve-fold increase over existing
American regulations in allowable cancer risk for American
98
consumers.
Bovine Somatotropin in Dairy Products. This interesting debate re-
lates quite
nicely to the debate between the EU, Canada and the US regarding bovine
growth
00
hormones in meat. In 1993, Monsanto sought FDA approval of Posilac, a ge-
netically
 See General Accounting Oce, International Food Safety: Comparison of U.S.
Codex Pesticide
Standards (August 1991).
 Patti Goldman & Richard Wiles, Public Citizen and the Environmental
Working Group, Trading
Away U.S. Food Safety (April 1994). See this report generally for an argument
that the VITO agreements
and NAFTA pose a grave threat to consumer protection from pesticide risks.
 See id. at 72. Legislation has been introduced into Congress to create a presump-
tion for Codex standards
unless the EPA can demonstrate formally that deviation is justied. See id.
Interestingly, BGH residues in milk have drawn considerably more public atten-
tion in the US than residues in meat. Consumer concern about BGH in meat
appears to have remained relatively steady in the US over the years, although
there may have been some increase during the time between the BGH panel and
AB reports. The following table summarizes Roper opinion polls conducted on
the issue of BGH in meat during the period up to 1994.
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49engineered counterpart of a natural bovine pituitary hormone, for injection into
dairy
cows.1 Studies show that the drug can increase milk yields between 10|
40%. 101 While the drug was pending FDA approval, many consumers and
consumer advocates publicly opposed market introduction of milk from cows
administered BGH|questioning both whether the product should be allowed
on the market at all and, if so, whether it should be labelled. Consumer and
environmental advocates questioned the necessity and wisdom of (1) administer-
ing the hormone to animals who may experience serious side eects, (2) selling
their milk to humans upon whom the health impacts remain uncertain, and (3)
Figure 4 Annual US Consumer Surveys on Hormones. *
Question: The following substances may or may not present a health hazard.
How much of a hazard do you consider (antibiotics C and hormones in livestock)?
1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1994
#Surveyed 1007 1019 1031 1005 2000 2006 2018
Serious hazard 57 61 61 56 53 55 50
Something of a haz-
ard
34 28 26 33 36 34 37
Nohazard 6 6 6 6 5 5 8
Unsure 3 5 7 5 6 6 5
* Survey sponsored by the Food Marketing Institute ana conducted by Opin-
ion Research Corporation. The surveys were conducted in the US by telephone and
administered to adults who had gone shopping within the previous two weeks. Com-
pilation of data available in LEXIS-NEXIS Market (library) Rpoll (le), a database
containing methodology and results of public opinion polls.
o For our purposes, the inclusion of antibiotics in the question undermines the
value of this data.
In August 1994, Roper conducted a telephone survey of 1014 adults and asked
respondents how high they
ranked a number of environmental problems on a scale of 1 | 10. The mean
response to food additives and hormones was 6.4. Public Opinion On-Line (Septem-
ber 8, 1994). Exactly three years later, (coincidentally?) after issuance of the BGH
panel report, when Roper polled another 1040 adults on the same question, the
mean response was 7.1. Public Opinion On-Line (October 10, 1997).
Meanwhile in Europe, although I have no evidence of a relationship between
the BGH dispute and uctuations in the EU meat market, it just to note that beef
consumption fell 7% in the EU in 1996 in contrast to the 2% increase that had been
projected for that year. See World Beef Market on Recovery Track: WTO, Business
Line, 17 September 1997, at 13.
'Note that Posilac is identied by several monikers in the debate: BGH, rBGH,
bovine somatotropin, bST, and rbST.
101 See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 85, at 982. The OTA found that milk output
increases 12% on average. See US Oce of Technology Assessment, U.S. Dairy
50Industry at a Crossroad: Biotechnology and Policy Choices, May 1991.
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51creating an even larger milk surplus than already exists in the US.'02 If FDA
refused approval to Posilac, eectively banning it from the market, or instituted
a mandatory labeling scheme, could the US have justied its actions to the
WTO? The WTO has not formally considered issue (1), which would fall under
GAFF Art. XX(b) to protect animal life and health. As for (3), the US could
not discriminate against importers solely because it produced an overabundance
of milk domestically. Finally, issue (2) is nearly identical to the subject of Meat
Hormones.'03
In reality, the FDA did approve Posilac, requiring only the normal labeling
for a prescription veterinary drug which consumers never see. FDA approval
did not quell consumer concern about the issue though, which continues at least
among some consumers and environmentalists today.'0 A number of consumers
even brought suit, challenging the FDA action in approving the drug, failing to
require consumer labeling,
102 See Peter Montague, Is BGH in Trouble?, Rachel's Environment and Health
VIeekly #483,
Environmental Research Foundation, 29 February 1996, at 1.
103 Thereby providing a perfect opportunity for the US to either be completely hyp-
ocritical or suddenly
reinterpret the SPS Agreement. VIithout conducting a thorough analysis of the
scientic evidence on both sides of the debate, however, it is impossible to suggest
whether there is sucient scientic evidence for purposes of the SPS Agreement to
justify negative FDA action on the substance.
104 The fact that BGH residues in milk is no longer a frequently cited consumer
issue may relate more to media tastes and human psychology than changes in objective
perception of safety. Human nature, and the media (who need stories), tend to
discount risks over time when they do not obviously manifest themselves. Given
that bovine somatotropin could create risks that are not readily identiable,
decreased consumer interest therefore may have no relationship whatsoever to
the state of science. It may suggest something about the eectiveness of labeling
over time though.
There is some evidence that consumer concern over BGH may relate directly to
basic awareness of the issue's existence. An April 1996 Roper survey asked con-
sumers: Has the synthetic hormone that causes cows to produce more milk
caused you to avoid certain foods? Twenty-two percent (22%) of respondents
replied armatively, 76% negatively, and 2% did not know. (Of course, with-
out labeling it is exceedingly dicult for consumers to know how to shop with the
BSE factor in mind.) In an earlier Roper survey, conducted February 1994, the food
product which the most consumers identied as remembering hearmn2 about in
the context of biotechnology was milk, yet relatively few consumers were aware
of the issue then either. Twenty-four percent (24%) remembered seeing or hearing
about genetically engineered milk (compared, e.g., to 20% for vegetables, 16% for
medicines/drugs, 8% for fruit, and 3% for meat/beef/cattle/livestock). See Public
Opinion On-Line (June 30, 1994). If the 22% of concerned respondents from the 1996
survey overlap signicantly with the 24% of aware consumers from the 1994 survey
(as intuitively suggested by the fact that people cannot worry well about things that
52they are unaware of), then the concern among consumers who know about BSE is
potentially quite high.
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53and failing to conduct an environmental impact assessment.105 Although
the district court granted summary judgment to the government on all counts,
the judge stated in the undisputed facts section of his opinion: Scientists,
economists, farmers, and environmental and animal welfare organizations have
questioned the safety and quality of rbST-derived products.... FDA received
thousands of letters from consumers asking it either to deny approval of rbST
or require labeling of rbST-derived products.1 In fact, a USDA-commissioned
study calculated that 94% of 1900 consumer respondents favored
107
labeling to help them make dairy choices. While the US's lack of respon-
siveness to
consumer concerns raises other issues beyond the scope of this paper, it is
sucient to note in this context, that, if challenged, the US could have been
forced to defend a more protective measure to the WTO dispute settlement
body.
In a related story, but conned to the US, the Vermont ice cream manu-
facturer Ben & Jerry's, a company that actively cultivates its natural image,
recently settled a notable dispute concerning BGH residues in dairy products.
The case arose from the following facts. Although FDA had refused to require
consumer labeling of milk products from rbST-treated cows when it approved
Posilac, FDA did eventually issue voluntary guidelines on consumer labeling.
However, the city of Chicago and the state of illinois refused to permit any
rbST-related labeling of products. Since national manufacturers can rarely af-
ford to produce multiple labels for dierent markets, the illinois laws eectively
stymied BGH labeling nationwide. Ben & Jerry's initiated a First Amendment
suit in
os See Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F.Supp. 1178 (VI.D. VIis. 1995)
'04 Id. at 1183.
107 See Ben & Jerry's, Press Release (14 August 1997): Legal Settlement Clears
Way For National AntirBGH Label, Ben & Jerry's Homemade Inc. website (14 August
1997)
<http://www.benjerry.com/bgh/bgh-il.html>.
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54federal district court, joined by Stonyeld Farm (a New Hampshire-based
yogurt and ice cream manufacturer), Whole Foods Market (the largest natural
food supermarket chain in the US), and Organic Valley (a Wisconsin farmers
cooperative that sells dairy products). The suit recently settled, allowing the
natural food companies to go forward with voluntary negative content label-
ing (e.g., BGH-free). In light of the settlement, Ben & Jerry's now explains
sympathetically explains on its Web page:
We've always wanted to tell you that the family farmers who provide our
milk and cream do not treat their cows with recombinant bovine growth hor-
mone (rBGH), but until now we just weren't allowed to.... Since 1994 illinois
has forbidden Ben & Jerry's, Organic Valley and Stonyeld Farm from adding
antirBGH labels to their products and threatened to seize any such
108
products that were sold there.
In a press release, all four companies made statements denitively linking
the settlement with consumer rights. Gary Hirshberg, CEO of Stonyeld Farm,
concluded:
This win signies a great step for freedom of speech, consumer rights and the
survival of family farms. Our dedication to using pure, all natural ingredients
and our ght against labeling bans shows [sic] our commitment to supporting
our customers right to know about the food they eat.'
The issue of labeling is considered in more depth later. At this juncture,
it is enough to note the apparently strong public support for labeling, at least
in some situations, in the absence of conclusive scientic evidence.110 It is also
important to recognize that this win was the result of a settlement and so
is not an answer from the courts.
' Ben & Jerry's, We're Starting a Food Fight: Ben & Jerry's Thoughts on Bovine
Growth
Hormone, Ben & Jeny's Homemade Inc. website (7 January 1997) <www.benjerry.com/bgh/>.
 Ben & Jerry's, Press Release, supra. note 107.
110 Some scientists believe that public concern about rbST milk is in fact justi-
ed. A January 1996 peer-
reviewed medical study suggests that rBGH may promote human breast and
colon cancer. See Samuel S.
Epstein, Unlabeled Milk from Cows Treated with Biosynthetic Growth Hormones:
A Case of Regulatory
Abdication, 26 Int'l J. of Health Services 173 (1996), cited in Montague, supra
note 102.
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55In conclusion, the political tug-of-war between US federal and state govern-
ments illuminates the even greater diculty of dealing with sovereignty issues at
the international level. Federalism, and the necessary loss of state sovereignty
that results, is well established by the US Constitution, and yet disputes still
arise regarding the division of power between two levels of government in a
unied country. At the international level, nation states are each at the top of
their own totem pole. Although they sometimes agree to accept limits on their
sovereign power in order to receive the benets of multinational agreements, the
degree of sovereignty forfeited is a delicate political issue.
C. Case Studies: Tuna, Shrimp, and Environmental Decision-
Making
The Tuna/Dolphin dispute well illustrates the critical overlap between food
policy
112
and environmental policy. While the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)
at the
heart of the dispute is not what would traditionally be termed a food regu-
lation, it does have ramications on the food supply arising directly out of the
fact that all food comes
 International perception of the inherent rights of sovereigns has changed
somewhat over time with
increasing globalization. For example, while absolute sovereignty within one's
own border was once a vital tenet of international law, evolving international public
and political opinion has created a more balanced
approach to sovereignty|including, e.g., the idea that sovereign rights may be par-
tially tempered by a
responsibility to protect the environment. See, e.g., The Stockholm Declaration
on the Human Environment (1972) (recognizing a limit on sovereign rights when
domestic activities aect states or jurisdictions beyond their borders); see also Trail
Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision, 35 Am.J.Int'l L. 684, 716 (1941)
(essentially relying on US original jurisdiction Supreme Court case in holding that
sovereignty does not extend to a right of states to emit transboundary pollutants);
The Law of the Sea Convention (1982)
(allowing states to exploit domestic natural resources pursuant to their en-
vironmental policies and in
accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment (em-
phasis added)).
112
As one commentator summarizes, VIhile the clairvoyant may have antici-
pated it earlier, the policy
struggle between environmental protection and liberal trade eectively began
in August 1991 [with Tuna I]. See VIilliam J. Snape III & Naomi B. Lefkovitz,
Searching for GATEs Environmental Miranda. Are Process Standards Getting Due
56Process?, 27 Cornell Int'l L.J. 777, 777 (1994). Given the parallel rise of trade
treaties and environmental treaties, the lack of international awareness of their
potential
collision course is actual somewhat astounding and should hardly have required
the services of a clairvoyant to anticipate.
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57from the environment. The subsequent corollary is that the harvesting of
food products
113
may have direct negative impacts on the environment.
1. Tuna I (1991)114
In 1990 Mexico requested convention of a WTO panel to hear its complaint
regarding two US environmental statutes that Mexico claimed inhibited free
trade in violation of the GAFF. The two statutes at issues were the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) and the Dolphin Protection Consumer In-
formation Act (DPCIA). Both statutes came into law in response to consumer
concern about dolphin mortality and injury incidental to use of the purse seine
shing technique. The MMPA required all importers of tuna to demonstrate
that their country has an overall regulatory regime regarding the taking of ma-
rine mammals comparable to the US regime; evidence of an incidental kill rate at
or below 1.25 times the average US rate for the same time period demonstrates
comparability. The complementary DPCIA specied voluntary labeling stan-
dards for tuna products sold in or exported by the United States. It permitted
the placement of a Dolphin Safe label on tuna products caught in the East-
ern Pacic Tropical Ocean (EPT) only if certain conditions were met regarding
incidental dolphin kills."5
 Of course, this reality could partially or wholly shift in the future if articial
means of generating food
are developed in response to world hunger and/or other food availability concerns.
Biotechnology raises a
host of issues that tend to shift the discussion from Tuna back to Meat Hormones.
114 Report of the Panel on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
3 September 1991, 1991 WL
771248 (G.A.T.T.), DS2lIR-395/155 [hereinafter Tuna I Panel Report]. The
Salinas government, under
pressure from the Bush administration, and in belated recognition of the poten-
tially unattractive political
consequences of making enemies with US environmentalists, did not seek ocial WTO
adoption of the
Tuna I panel report. See Charnovitz, The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defog-
ging the Debate, 23 Envtl. L.
475, 483 (1993).
Note that this report, like Tuna I, was never ocially adopted by a WTO
consensus.
 See id. at 5.6. For information on recent developments pertaining to the Dolphin
Safe label, see Public
Citizen Global Trade Watch, GA77i'zilla v Flipper Round 111: Threat of WTO
Challenge Pressures US
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58The panel examined four aspects of the US measures to determine whether
either violated the GAFF, and if so whether any Article XX exceptions were
applicable. The two legal aspects of the report that are most relevant to this dis-
cussion include (1) the provisions of the MMPA on which prohibition of Mexican
tuna was based and (2) the voluntary labeling provisions of the DPCIA.6
The MiVIPA. Recall that the GAFF explicitly permits internal taxation and
regulation under Article Ill, as long as the Member aords national treatment,
while disallowing quantitative restrictions under Article XI. The panel rst con-
sidered which Article applied to the MMPA provisions regarding foreign kill
rates. Mexico complained that the MMPA constituted an Art. XI quantitative
restriction on the product tuna.,,117 Further, Mexico argued, the regulations
were less favorable to importers than domestic producers under Art. l because
the Act based foreign compliance on a retroactive variable dependent on the
actual US domestic kill rate; consequently, Mexico could not know whether it
was in compliance during the year until the end of the year when the US cal-
culated its own average. The US disagreed, arguing that the product at issue
was actually tuna-caught-by-certain-shing-methods and that treatment of such
products was identical. In other words, the US argued that the MMPA provi-
sions were Art. Ill internal regulations that did provide national treatment. The
panel rejected the American argument, agreeing with Mexico that the product
at issue was tuna and that the MMPA provisions were an Art. XI quantitative
restriction in nature.8 The panel noted that the
Congress to Gut Eective Dolphin Protection Law in The World Trade Organiza-
tion at 39 Months: A Sampling of the Damage and Dangers So Far 5 (March 1998).
116 See Tuna I Panel Report at 5.7.
 See id. at 5.8.
118 See id. at 5.14.
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59 See id. at 5.27.
120 id. at 5.28.
121 See id. at 5.33.
MMPA could not be a internal regulation since the regulation had nothing to
do with the actual product tuna (a typical GAFF product-process distinction).
Mexico having established a prima facie case of inconsistency between the
MMPA and the GAFF, the panel proceeded to consider the US's arguments
that the MMPA was excepted by Arts. XX(b) or (g). Recall that Art. XX(g)
pertains to measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.
Since dolphins live in the high seas, the panel rst studied the jurisdictional
question|whether XX(b) is intended to cover animal life beyond a Member's
land or territorial waters. After admitting genuine ambiguity in the GAFF,
the Tuna I panel nonetheless concluded that the GAFF's drafting history sug-
gests the drafters intended only to except measures to protect health of animals
located within a Member's jurisdiction.9 But even if XX(b) does apply to extra-
jurisdictional protection, the panel continued, Mexico was correct that the mea-
sures were not necessary within the meaning of Articles XX(b) and (g) for two
reasons. First, the 1.25 x actual US domestic kill rate method was too unsci-
entic and unpredictable to be necessary. Secondly, international cooperation
was both a more desirable and a more appropriate option to pursue rst.'20 The
panel also rejected the US's XX(g) argument. Article XX(g) provides an excep-
tion for measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
if such measures are made eective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption. Again, the extra-jurisdictional nature of the mea-
sures and the arbitrariness and uncertainty of the 1.25 calculation defeated this
US argument.'2'
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60'22 See id. at 5.41.
123 See id. at 5.42.
 See id. at 5.43.
The DPCIA. The US fared better when the panel considered the voluntary
labeling provisions of the DPCIA. The panel rst rejected Mexico's argument
that these provisions constitute unfavorable product-marking requirements un-
der GAFF Article IX: 1; it found as a matter of law that Art. IX: 1 only applies
to marks of national origin.'22 The panel then concluded that DPCIA's labeling
provisions do not restrict tuna sales since tuna can be sold freely with or without
the label and because the only competitive advantage gained by labelled prod-
ucts arose solely from consumer preference.'23 The panel also rejected Mexico's
argument that the labeling option violated Article 1:1 by discriminating against
countries that shed in the Eastern Pacic Ocean (ETP). The panel found that
the voluntary labeling measures related specically to the ETP simply because
of the unique fact that tuna had been documented to swim in schools below
dolphins solely in that region, resulting in intentional deployment of purse seine
nets in the ETP to encircle dolphins and corresponding high incidental dolphin
kill rates.124 Further, the panel reasoned, US customs law considers the origin of
sh products to be the shing vessel's countly of registry, so any country shing
in the ETP is subject to the DPCIA. Since the complainants in Tuna 11 did
not challenge the DPCIA, the Tuna I panel report provides the WTO dispute
settlement body's only guidance thus far as to food labeling.
2. Subsequent Events and Tuna II (1994) 125
Two events of note occurred in 1992 pertaining to the Tuna/Dolphin dispute.
In June, the US, Mexico, and ten other countries negotiated an international
agreement in
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61June under the auspices of the preexisting Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission
126
(IAFFC). The signatories agreed to reduce dolphin mortality below 5000 by
1999. In October, despite the IIATC agreement and with little regard to the
panel's ndings in
Tuna I, Congress amended MMPA. The amended act provided for suspen-
sion of the US tuna embargo, but only against those countries that entered into
formal agreement with the US to (1) implement a global moratorium by March
1994, (2) reduce dolphin mortality in the meantime, and (3) require observers, If
a country promised to meet the requirements and failed, the ban would be rein-
stated. If the ban was unsuccessful after 60 days in bending oending countries
to the US's will, further trade sanctions would be brought against those coun-
tries. Finally, a ban was scheduled to go into eect on all dolphin-unsafe tuna
beginning June 1994.127 At the time of the MMPA amendments, the EU and
the Netherlands had already led WTO co-complaints, alleging that the MMPA
was inconsistent with the GAFF, and a panel had convened. Following a pause
requested by the co-complainants to evaluate the US amendments, and after
consultation between the parties, the panel decided that it would consider the
new legislative provisions during the proceeding.'28 Thus the panel addressed
the amendments as well as many of the issues raised in Tuna I.
The Tuna 11 panel essentially agreed with the reasoning of the Tuna I panel
with one important exception, although it did not cite the unadopted report as
an authority. The
Report of the Panel on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 16
June 1994, 1994 VIL 907620
(G.A.T.T.), D529/R [hereinafter Tuna II Panel Report]. Note that this
report, like the Tuna I panel's, was
never ocially adopted by the VITO.
126 See Agreement for the Reduction of Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern Pacic
Ocean (EPO), done at La
Jolla, June 1992, 33 I.L.M. 936 (1994). The US and Costa Rica established the IAITC
in 1949 for
purposes of tuna conservation. See Tuna II Panel Report at 2.3.
127 See International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102-523, 62,
106 Stat. 3425 (1992).
128 See Tuna II Panel Report at 1.4.
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62Tuna 11 panel agreed that GAFF Art. III did not apply to the US measures
because the
and tuna 129
product at issue was tuna was not regulated at the point of importation. It
also agreed that the national embargoes constituted prohibitions or restrictions
on trade
in contravention of GAFF Art. XI since they banned tuna imports from
other Member
130
nations that did not share US policy. The US again argued for exceptions based
on
Arts. XX(b) and (g), but the Tuna 11 panel rejected those arguments as the
Tuna I panel had before them. The Tuna 11 panel importantly disagreed with
the Tuna I panel as to the jurisdictional issue though. In their consideration of
the applicability of Art. XX(g), the panel concluded quite succinctly that there
was no valid reason to conclude that the provision applied only to conservation
measures related to domestic natural resources.
The panel nonetheless rejected both of the US's Art. XX arguments, rea-
soning that measures aimed at forcing other nations to change their purely
domestic policies (and which, in fact, could only be eective by accomplishing
such a result) are inappropriate in the context of the basic principles and objec-
tives of the GAFF. Thus, such measures could not be necessary (Art. XX(b))
or primarily aimed at conservation (Art. XX(g)). Referencing the desirability
of narrow interpretation, the panel predicted:
If Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting parties to deviate from
the obligations of the [GAFF] by taking trade measures to implement poli-
cies, including conservation policies, within their own jurisdiction, the basic
objectives of the [GAFF] would be maintained. If however Article XX were
interpreted to permit contracting parties to take trade measures so as to force
'29 See id. at 5.8|5.9.
'30 See id. at 5.10.
' See id. at 5.20; see also Chamovitz, supra note 114, at 495 | 498 & fn.86.
VIriting before Tuna II, Charnovitz heavily criticized the Tuna I panel's extra-
jurisdictionality argument. He questioned the panel's adoption of the fuzzy term
extra-jurisdictional and pointed out that the MMPA is clearly not extraterritorial in
the legal sense|the Act covers imported food products, as opposed to extending legal
jurisdiction to the behavior of foreign parties (such as forbidding American companies
in foreign countries to buy Mexican tuna or foreign sherman to sh with purse seine
nets).
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63other contracting parties to change their policies within their jurisdiction,
including conservation policies, the balance of rights and obligations among con-
tracting parties, in particular the right of access to markets, would be seriously
impaired. Under such an interpretation, the General Agreement could no longer
serve as a multilateral framework for trade among contracting parties.'32
Accordingly, the panel adopted the former approach, focusing on the distinc-
tion between forcing foreign government policy-making and inuencing commer-
cial activity abroad.'33
From a policy perspective, the Tuna 11 panel's rejection of the Tuna I panel's
extra-jurisdictionality analysis bodes well for environmentalists concerned with
the ability of their governments to enact conservation measures. It is unclear
from the panel's report though, what measures would fall within the panel's
narrow permissible range of ones that create trade incentives to do what the
Member wants but do not try to force other Member governments to adopt
policies in their own jurisdictions. For instance, the US cannot actually pass laws
in other jurisdictions; a ban at the border on tuna caught in an oensive manner
would be unenforceable, as well as an impermissible process distinction; and
under the Tuna 11 panel's interpretation the US cannot require other nations
to adopt certain policy measures as means to accomplish the US's ends. What
precisely is left? The panel comments in its concluding observations: [T]he issue
in this dispute was not the validity of the environmental objectives of the United
States to protect and conserve dolphins. The issue was whether, in the pursuit
of its environmental objectives, the United States could impose trade embargoes
to secure changes in the policies which other contracting parties pursued within
their own jurisdiction.' The
132 Tuna II Panel Report at 5.26.
'33
The tuna ban was lifted on 15 August 1997, and there have been some changes
to the dolphin safe
labelling scheme. See generally Public Citizen Global Trade VIatch, supra note
115, at 5. '' Id. at 5.42.
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64panel does not illuminate what trade measures would be permissible. De-
spite the panel's distinction between commercially attractive and policy-forcing
measures, the only types of regulations that are clearly permissible are ones that
are purely domestic. A ViTO document dated only four days after the Appellate
Body's report on BGH is no more helpful, stating, Subject to [the requirement
of nondiscrimination] being met, WTO rules place essentially no constraints on
the policy choices available to a country to protect its own environment against
damage either from domestic production or from the consumption of domesti-
cally produced or imported products. ' This statement does not illuminate the
question of the non-jurisdictional areas which Tuna 11 implies it is permissible
for Members to worry about conserving.
3. Shrimp (1998)136
The very recent dispute over US embargoes on shrimp based on turtle pro-
tection measures bears a striking resemblance to the Tuna dispute. Although
the neither Tuna panel report was adopted, the Shrimp panel refers to the Tuna
11 panel report as relevant and useful.'37 It should be noted that the Shrimp de-
cision is only a few weeks old and has not even been made public yet. While the
US has indicated it will appeal,'38 the dispute settlement body's unsympathetic
approach in Tuna I and 11, as well as in the
13S WTO, About Trade and Environment in the WTO: Eco-labeling, VITO website
(20 January 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/environ/environm.htm>.
136 Report of the Panel on United States Restrictions on Imports of Shrimp,
| 1998. 1998 VIL
(VI.T.O.), D558/R [hereinafter Shrimp Panel Report]. I encountered great
diculty in trying to obtain the panel report on this dispute. The WTO was
prompt but unhelpful when I emailed them about the report| telling me only
that it was unocial as yet but would be available on their website within hours of
release (whenever that might be|the W'TO only releases DSB reports upon the
request of a Member). I particularly mention this diculty because it is illustrative
of some later points I make regarding secrecy in the WTO process. My analysis of
the Shrimp panel report is therefore, by necessity, based upon the Findings section
of an unocial copy of the nal report that I obtained from an NGO in VIashington,
D.C (who got it from the Oce of the US Trade Representative).
 See Shrimp Panel Report at fn. 662.
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65Shrimp panel report, necessarily generate some pessimism about the US's
chances for a successful appeal. The Appellate Body could conceivably take
a dierent view than the panels though, and, at any rate, is at least likely to
clarify some of the panel's GAFF interpretations.
Sea turtles encounter a variety of risks in their modern environments. The
animals are exploited by humans for their meat, eggs, and shells; they are im-
pacted by ocean pollution and habitat destruction; and they are at serious risk
of incidental capture by sherman.'39 All species of sea turtles are listed as
threatened or endangered species under both the US Endangered Species Act
of 1973 (ESA) and the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES))0 In response to this situation, the US National Marine Fish-
eries Service developed turtle exclusion devices (TEDs) which allow shrimp to
pass through while quite eectively excluding turtles and other larger sea crea-
tures.
Since 1987, US shrimp trawlers have been required to use TEDs, or else
observe certain tow time restrictions, to reduce incidental sea turtle kills. The
ViTO dispute centered on a complementary US law, enacted in 1989, referred
to as Section 609. Section 609(b)(l) reads:
The importation of shrimp or products from shrimp which have been har-
vested with commercial shing technology which may aect adversely [sea tur-
tles] shall be prohibited no later than May 1, 1991, except as provided in para-
graph (2) [i.e., the exporting nation is certied].
138 See Francis VIilliams, US to Challenge Turtle Ruling, Financial Times (17
March 1998).
 Shrimp Panel Report at 7.1.
1Although all the parties to this dispute our parties to CITES, the US did not
pursue a CITES challenge
because, as the panel notes, CITES applies only to trade in endangered species,
and the turtles are not being traded. See Shrimp Panel Report at 7.58. The
VI'I'O dispute settlement body has yet to address the
implications of non-VITO multilateral environmental agreements for the VITO
framework.
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66The US initially implemented Section 609 only against countries located in the
Caribbean/Western Atlantic region, but the US Court of International Trade (ClT)
ruled
in 1996 that the law required the government to apply Section 609 to all countries.141
The
ClT also ruled that the embargo is nation-based rather than catch-based, so
an embargo must cover shrimp actually caught with TEDs if the trawler is from
an embargoed
142
country. The US Secretary of State responded with revised Section 609 guide-
lines in
April 1996, requiring governments to supply documentary evidence that they
have a regulatory program comparable to the US's pertaining to sea turtles, and
that their national average kill rate is comparable to that of US vessels.'3 India,
Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand requested convention of a ViTO panel on the
matter.
All four complainants argued that Section 609 violates GAFF Article XI: 1,
and three argued that it violates Articles 1:1 and XIII: 1 as well. The US raised
an armative defense under Articles XX(b) and (g). With some variations, but
essentially relying on the same rationales given by the panels in Tuna I and 11,
the panel concluded that the measures do violate GAFF Art. XI and that an
Art. XX defense is unavailable.' In evaluating the Art. XX argument, the panel
focused more narrowly on the chapeau to Art.
XX than the Tuna panels had done. Where the Tuna panels had argued
that the US measures regarding tuna were not necessary within the meanings
of Arts. XX (b) or (g)|because their unilateral nature was inappropriate and
threatening to the multilateral
\The plaintis sought to compel the US to enforce the turtle-shrimp pro-
visions of the ESA, and included Earth Island Institute, the Sierra Club, the
Humane Society of the US, and the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals.
'42 See Shrimp Panel Report at 7.16.
Id. at 7.5. A showing that the country has a TED-based program comparable to the
US scheme constitutes prima facie evidence of a comparable kill rate.
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67regime|the Shrimp panel concluded that the US's unilateral measures re-
garding shrimp are not in accord with the general principles of the GAFF, as
expressed in the term
unjustiable in the Art. XX chapeau|and so inappropriate and threatening to
the
multilateral regime. The Shrimp panel characterized its nding as an interpre-
tation of the scope of Art. XX exceptions.'5 By rejecting Art. XX's applica-
bility on the basis of the chapeau, the panel avoided the Art. XX(g) extra-
jurisdictionality question.'6
The Shrimp panel concluded, like the Tuna panels before it, that the US
environmental measures threatened the principles of GAFF and the ViTO
agreements
generally by relying on unilateral action. Adoption of similar measures by
multiple ViTO members, the panel concluded, would undermine and unravel
the entire WTO framework. The panel predicted that, under an alternative
interpretation of Art. XX, GAFF 1994 and the ViTO Agreement could no
longer serve as a multilateral framework for trade among
Members and that [m]arket access for goods could become subject to an in-
creasing number of conicting policy requirements for the same product [which]
would rapidly lead to the end of the ViTO multilateral trading system."
The most interesting question raised by the Shrimp panel relates to the
ViTO's
preference for multilateral environmental agreements in accord with its gen-
eral principles of international cooperation and free trade. The panel noted that
MEAs are a long
recognized method of achieving environmental protection, that the US did
not claim to be allowed or required by a non-ViTO multilateral treaty to impose
the ban, and that the
'The panel did not reach the Art. 1:1 or XIII: I challenges. See id. at 7.18 |7.23.
's See id. at 7.25 | 7.29.
146 id. at 7.24 & 7.64|7.65.
'47 Id. at 7.45.
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68148 Id. at 7.50.
 See id.
CIT interpreted Section 609 as requiring comprehensive requirements (emphasis
added) for nations. The panel stated:
[W]e are limiting our nding to measures|taken independently of any such
international obligation|conditioning access to the US market for a given prod-
uct on the adoption by the exporting Member of certain conservation policies.
In this regard, we note that banning the importation of a particular product
does not per se imply that a change in policy is required from the country whose
exports are subject to the import prohibitions.','8 (emphasis added)
The panel provided several examples: (1) a Member may ban unsafe prod-
ucts while accepting similar safe products, but it may not refuse all imports
from an exporting Member on the grounds that the exporting Member allows
some production of unsafe products for domestic use or export elsewhere;'9 (2)
a Member may set minimum characteristics for entry of a product into its mar-
ket, but it may not require Members to set policies comparable to their own for
domestic production or export to other countnes.
The intriguing question raised by the Shrimp panel report is what consti-
tutes multilateral action for purposes of the ViTO agreements. More specically,
can agreement among less than the whole membership of the ViTO establish
international standards for environmental protection which Members may then
act upon against all Members. If less than a consensus, how many Members
must agree to a multilateral action|a signicant number less than half, a ma-
jority, a supermajority? Does it matter whether there are a signicant number
of non-Members who have adopted similar policies? The panel cites a number
of international treaties in support of the basic idea
59
69that environmental decision-making which aects international aairs and trade
should be pursued in a multilateral manner, including the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development (1992) and the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity (1992). '' But how international? Hopefully, the Appellate Body will esh
out this important question.
One determination of the panel does not bode well for a more relaxed inter-
pretation of multilateral by the AR. The US actually did attempt to argue that
use of TEDs to protect sea turtles is an international standard. The US argued
three points:
rst, that the international community has long recognized the importance
of protecting endangered species; secondly, that a number of existing interna-
tional conventions, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Seas and the 1992 Agenda 21 on Sustainable Development, require signa-
tories to adopt conservation measures and urge resource management such as
prevention of incidental takings during shing operations; and, thirdly, that 19
countries already required TEDs on all shrimp trawl vessels in their jurisdiction,
having acted either on their own initiative or under the Inter-American Conven-
tion on the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles.'52 The Shrimp panel
concluded that the US's citation to only regional agreements and voluntary use
of TEDs failed to establish that the use of TEDs constituted a recognized mul-
tilateral environmental standard applicable to the complainants'53 (emphasis
added). If the AR upholds the panel's seemingly high threshold for establishing
an international
'50Seeid at7.51.
Rio recognizes the sovereign right of states to set environmental policy in light
of their own situations and values while stressing the importance of international
cooperation and multilateral action. See id. at 7.52. The Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity also proposes international cooperation through competent international
organizations as to manners outside national jurisdiction. See id. at 7.53.
152 See id. at 7.57.
153 See id. at 7.59.
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70environmental standard , then it seems unlikely that anything short of a
ViTO consensus, perhaps facilitated by the ViTO Committee on Trade and
Environment, could justify
imposition of measures to the dispute settlement body.
IV. Concludin2 Remarks: The Potential ImDact of
the WTO Treaties
on Domestic Food Re2ulation
A. Issues for Consideration
ViTO treaty interpretation is an evolving process, and as such there will
always be opportunities to alter (through negotiation rounds) or reinterpret
(through the dispute settlement mechanism) the ViTO treaties to t the needs
of member nations. W'rO members are currently engaged in a process of deter-
mining how to balance the competing, but not necessarily conicting, goals of
strong environmental/consumer protection policies and maximized free trade.
Accordingly, and surely at least partially in deference to rm stances taken by
the US and EU (both Big Four members) regarding sovereignty in these matters,
the ViTO dispute settlement body appears to be adopting a somewhat more
exible approach to environmental and consumer protection measures. This
increased exibility, demonstrated in the two week old Shrimp panel report and
the six month old BGH appellate report, are at least partially responsive to
strong criticism of the earlier decisions. Given the single case regarding scien-
tic uncertainty, it is particularly dicult to tell where the ViTO will go with
this issue. The Shrimp panel report appears to be a denite improvement on
the Tuna reports in that it suggests that conservationist measures that go be-
yond national boundaries are not per se impermissible under the GAFF, nicely
following up on the extra-jurisdictionality nding in the unadopted Tuna II.
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71Sensitivity to sovereignty issues is very important for the ViTO in general
and the dispute settlement body in particular. Responding to signicant Mem-
ber anxiety about loss of sovereignty over such fundamental issues as consumer
and environmental protection not only increases the ViTO's legitimacy, which is
fundamentally necessary for a successful international regime, but it recognizes
the complicated nature of many real world policy decisions including those that
relate to food safety. However, both the BGH appellate report and the Shrimp
panel report suer from a critical aw|while they each suggest that there
is a perfectly reasonable way to achieve the desired level of consumer and/or
environmental protection by means other than the chosen measures that are
completely consistent with the ViTO agreements, they fail upon inspection to
give any real guidance as to what those alternatives might be. Given the relative
infrequency of ViTO dispute settlements on these matters and given the lengthy
political processes necessary to enact such measures, especially in democratic
nations, it is unlikely that ViTO members will be willing to use a trial and error
approach perhaps somewhat more tenable in a domestic adjudicative setting.
Without better guidance, at least some important Members with much to lose
economically will eventually either (1) leave the WTO regime rather than obey
the DSB 's interpretations of the ViTO agreements or (2) give in to the pressure
towards downward harmonization, which might lead to eventually disastrous,
non-sustainable development.
A number of areas are in particular need of evaluation and development,
as indicated by the ViTO dispute settlement body's interpretations to date re-
garding environmental and consumer protection. Important areas for discussion
include ViTO
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72procedure, the product-process distinction, Codex standards, labeling, US
leadership, and the risk of downward harmonization
WTO Procedure. Several elements of the ViTO process, including the pro-
visions of the DSU, have been heavily criticized by consumer and environmental
advocates who feel that, among other problems, the ViTO process oers far too
few, if any, signicant opportunities for public participation. Public Citizen has
identied a number of what it considers biases, which potentially undermine
any public legitimacy in the ViTO result:
(1) ViTO requirements for membership on DSB tribunals favor trade lib-
eralization over other policy values; (2) the DSB operates in secret with oral
arguments and documents visible only to national government representatives;
(3) the DSB does not accept amicus briefs from NGOs or other outsiders unless
ocially submitted by a participating
54
government; (4) NGOs have received only minor concessions to allow some
presence
in the US's ocial trade advisory system while industry has much more
extensive access to information and many opportunities to give input due to the
structure of the system; and (5) the ViTO system promotes only increased trade
and better economies without due consideration to other goals such as improved
democratic accountability, distributive justice, or promotion of consumer and
environmental protection.'55 Earth Island Institute, an American NGO working
on conservation issues, has argued that the ViTO regime is basically oensive
to democracy and sovereignty, particularly noting the make-up of the
's The Shrimp panel actually noted rather grouchily in its report that it received
submissions from
American NGOs that it did not ask for and would not consider as such. The US
was permitted to submit the NGO's material if it wished to do so. In this case,
the US attached one section of a document submitted by the Center for Marine
Conservation and the Center for International Environmental Law to its second panel
submission. See Shrimp Panel Report at 7.8.
 Public Citizen, Harmonization, supra note 4, at 3 | 5. Public Citizens argues that
these imbalances
derive at least partially from the fast track approach taken to the VITO agreements
(and NAFTA), which provided Congress with an extremely limited role in developing
treaties that were negotiated largely in
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73panel in the Shrimp dispute: two persons from nations that were named as
interested parties and had openly sided with the challengers plus one person
from a nation that had previously been embargoed under US law. A situation
Earth Island refers to as a classic case of the fox watching the hens.'56 In the
wake of the BGH panel report, EU Agricultural Commission raised a political
stir by stating that the ViTO lacked clear democratic controls.'57 Meanwhile, a
number of academic commentators have suggested that the dispute settlement
process is clouded by political considerations which undermine the proce5s.'58
The Product-Process Distinction. From the standpoint of an environmen-
tal or consumer advocate, the product-process distinction is one of the most
dicult aspects of the ViTO agreements. It almost inescapably impedes the
enactment of regulations related to labor standards (including child labor), en-
vironmental standards (such as factory emissions), and other consumer protec-
tion measures. The basic principle behind generally not allowing process and
production method (PPM) distinctions is that Members do not have a right to
force their personal policies onto other Members and that international issues
should be approached and resolved multilaterally. If international standards
(which may or may not be less than a consensus) cannot be achieved then a
WTO member who
secret by unelected and largely unaccountable government agents. See id. at 4.
56
Earth Island Institute, News Release: Environmentalists Blast Free Trade Panel
for Conict of Interest
(4 June 1997). Todd Steiner, director of the Institute's Sea Turtle Restoration
Project, echoes loudly
Public's Citizens concerns about the VITO generally: [The VITO] consists of secret
meetings, conicts of interest, and no public participation. In this age of democ-
racy, the VITO is an international embarrassment. See Earth Island Institute, News
Release: Environmentalists Blast International Trade Panel Decision (16
March 1998).
 EU/US: Fischler Condemns WTO 's Lack of Democratic Checks, European
Reports (European Information Service) (6 September 1997), at * 1.
'ss See, e.g., Mike Meier, GAiT, WTO, and the Environment: To What Extent Do
GA7T/WTO Rules Permit Member Nations to Protect the Environment When Doing
So Aects Trade?, 8 Cob. I. Int'l. Envtl. L. &
Pol'y 241, 243 (Summer 1997).
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74Tuna I Panel Report at 5.27.
wishes to impose non-conforming measures must either pay the price in re-
taliatory measures or leave the ViTO. As the Tuna I panel notes, a Member
could have chosen only to sign trade agreements with countries having similar
standards.'59 Production processes for food and other goods are an increasingly
sensitive issue for consumers though. Both the ViTO membership and indi-
vidual nation states need to deal squarely with the process-product distinction,
perhaps revisiting whether allowing process distinctions is not appropriate in
certain instances.
The Codex Commission. The SPS Agreement makes Codex standards
the international standards which over 130 nations, including the most advanced
democracies, must either conform to (to avoid any challenge), base their stan-
dards upon (to prevent the burden of proof shifting to them in a challenge),
or be prepared to justify deviating from (based on a potentially high thresh-
old of scientic information). Similar to procedural fairness concerns about
the ViTO process, the increasingly important international role of Codex ne-
cessitates greater attention to its procedures, scientic methods, and trans-
parency. Public Citizen and the Environmental Working Group complain that:
(1) Codex does not have minimum requirements for study design or for con-
tent/completeness of data sets in studies it uses in standard-setting; (2) Codex
has no minimum requirements for contents and completeness of data sets it uses
to establish standards; (3) Codex does not consider varying dietary exposure
in dierent cultures when setting standards; and (4) Codex meetings are closed
to the general public so their positions can only be presented to the Commis-
sion through a sympathetic governmental participant, unlike industry. These
organizations recommend in their report that Codex
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75act as an international science data center rather than an international
standard-setter.160
Labeling. While nondiscrimination in international markets, in the words
of the ViTO, guarantees consumer choice, 61 those choices cannot be made
intelligently without information, which is the strongest argument in favor of
labeling. When consumers demand information on process, and the ViTO agree-
ments refuses to allow Members to give it, there is a conict between consumer
expectations and the ViTO agreements that citizen consumers may or may not
accept in the long run. And if there is consumer market demand for labelled
food products, then an interpretation of the ViTO agreements that prohibits
that information entering the market seems more protectionist of trade than
merely facilitative of it, since such an interpretation prevents consumers from
making informed market choice according to their actual preferences.'62
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The ViTO Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE) has rightly
identied eco-labeling as a hot issue.164 While noting that the preferred
approach for governments to take in tackling transboundary or global environ-
mental problems is
' See Patti Goldman & Richard VIiles, Public Citizen & the Environmental
Working Group, supra note
95.
161 Id.
162
A number of countries already have public or private eco-labelling schemes, includ-
ing Germany (Blue
Angel), the Scandinavian countries (VIhite Swan), and the US (Green Seal). For
more information on eco-labelling programs, see generally Elliot B. Stan, Trade
Barriers or Trade Boon? A Critical
Evaluation of Environmental Labeling and Its Role in the Greening of World Trade,
21 Cob. J. Envtl.
L. 205, 225 (1996); see also US Environmental Protection Agency, Status
Report on Environmental Labels Worldwide (1993).
163 The VITO General Council created the CTh on 31 January 1995 to address
trade and environment concerns which had arisen and continue to arise under the
VITO agreements.
' The US noted in its statement to the President regarding the CTh, however, that
much division existed among Members, particularly between developed and developing
countries, regarding the consistency of eco-labeling with the VITO agreements. The
US stated to the President that it did not interpret the TBT
Agreement as per se invalidating eco-labeling schemes, but did not elaborate on the
circumstances of perceived consistency. See US Statement of Administrative Action,
supra note 4, at 56 | 57.
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cooperative, multilateral action, CTE acknowledges that eco-labeling pro-
grammes are important environmental policy instruments.'66 However, CTE is,
not surprisingly, concerned about PPM-based labelling. The TBT Agreement
addresses eco-labeling of products with non-identical nal characteristics (e.g.,
automobile emissions, energy
economy information). As the CTE recognizes, the issue of PPM-based
labeling for
167
identical end products under the TBT Agreement must be explored. Guide-
lines for
labeling of food products in the face of scientic uncertainty about the safety
of one or more ingredients should also be investigated. Since the TBT specif-
ically does not cover sanitary measures as dened in the SPS Agreement, the
ViTO needs to clarify whether such labelling is subject to the TBT Agreement's
lower threshold (legitimate purposes) or the SPS Agreement's higher one (based
on science).
Consumer labeling cannot cure the ails of the world. The cigarette wamings,
for instance, have hardly eradicated tobacco-induced lung cancer. But labeling
may be an alternative when a Member wants to be cautious in the face of
scientic uncertainty without taking more trade restrictive measures. In this
situation, labeling actually seems to t quite well with the spirit of the SPS
Agreement. Labels may also be appropriate in response to consumer demand
for process information. The dispute settlement body has not said enough about
labeling to date. Voluntary Dolphin Safe labels were held consistent with the
GAFF in the unadopted Tuna I panel decision, and the BGH panel
165 WTO, About Trade and the Environment in the WTO: Trade Measures for
Environmental Purposes,
WTO website (20 January 1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/environ/environm.htm>.
' WTO, Eco-labeling, supra note 135. I state earlier that food policy and environ-
mental policy are
intimately related and what looks like the latter may also be the former. The argu-
ment runs both ways: ecolabeling obviously refers to the environment and may be
misconstrued to refer only to conservation issues, but no BGH labels on meat would
almost certainly be considered eco-labels too.
167 See id.
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alluded to voluntary natural labels on meat. In a dierent type of environ-
mental case,
the ViTO DSB upheld mandatory point-of-sale labelling providing automobile fuel
economy information on the grounds they were nondiscriminatory.'69 While these
facts are promising, labelling should be addressed more squarely. Food products
could be a perfect test case for an experiment in process labeling, should the
ViTO nd such an experiment useful, since the FDA already has fairly extensive
labeling requirements.'70
US Consistency. The US has behaved rather schizophrenically to date. It
is particularly unfortunate that it and the EU are standing rmly on opposite
sides of the Meat Hormones and GMO debates. While standing rm about more
traditional environmental regulations pertaining to conservation, decreeing the
sanctity of sovereign rights and an international moral imperative, the US has
acted rather abysmally when it comes to consumer protection standards that
threaten the US' s multi-billion dollar meat and dairy industry. i When the US
was ruled against in a ViTO case against
168 [T]he ability of any Member to enact measures which are intended to protect
not consumer health but other consumer concerns was not addressed. In this regard,
we are aware that in some countries where the use of growth promoting hormones is
permitted in beef production, voluntary labeling schemes operate
whereby beef from animals which have not received such treatment may be so labelled.
BGH Panel Report at 8.274.
169
Report of the Panel on US Measures Concerning Taxes on Automobiles, 11
October 1994, 1994 WL
910937, D531/R.
170 Section 403 of the FFDCA requires every packaged food to be labelled with at
least the following: (1)
the common name of the food, (2) the foods ingredients, (3) an accurate statement
of net quantity, (4) the manufacturer or distributor's name and address, (5) and
specied nutrition information. The country of
origin requirements come from 8304 of the Tari Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 81304. For
an argument that these requirements should be extended to ingredients in otherwise
domestic foods, see Country-of-Origin
Labeling Requirements for Imported Meat and Other Food Products, Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on VIays and Means.
171 The EU refuses to repeal its measures and is submitting to arbitration to
determine appropriate
retaliatory measures. See Request for Arbitration by the European Communities
regarding EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), April 16,
1998 (WTIDS26/14). The EU has insisted that it will not lift the ban ever since
the original panel decision. See, e.g., Peter Blackburn, EU's Fischler Deant on
78Meat Hormone Ban, Reuter European Community Report (Brussels, 26 January 1996)
(discussing the EU Farmer Commissioner's reaction to the BGH panel report); France
Urges EU to Appeal WTO Meat Hormone Ruling, Reuter European Business Report
(20 May 1997) (citing statements by the French Farm Minister that [t]hese [VITO
panel] conclusions are totally unacceptable and that they place
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79Japan regarding trade in photography equipment,'72 US Sen. John Ashcroft
(R-Mo) expressed that the ruling raises serious questions about the credibility
of this international body and of the US trade representative's capacity to se-
cure and defend trade agreements.'73 Yet Sen. Lugar, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Agriculture, declares that the EU needs to get over its concern
about genetically modied organisms.'7
Downward harmonization. Finally, I would like to touch again on the
threat of
175
downward harmonization. The SPS Agreement tentatively establishes a
oor, albeit an
unenforceable one, for sanitary measures. I say unenforceable because, while
Members are supposed conform to or base their standards on the Codex, the
structure of the SPS Agreement suggests that it is extremely unlikely that a
Member will be challenged in the ViTO for having less stringent standards.
Meanwhile, ViTO members with superior food safety and environmental pro-
tection regulations, e.g., have economic incentives to reduce their levels of pro-
tection to the minimum required unless they cannot get a sucient number of
other Members to adopt their policies or they are under strong and sustained
consumer pressure. The presumption of SPS and GAFF consistency for mea-
sures conforming to Codex standards alone creates a strong downward force,
promising a
trade interests ahead of public health concerns). The EU also declared in January
that it will conduct
another risk assessment in light of the AB decision. See Europeans Press Their Beef
Ban, N.Y. Times (17 January 1998), at D3. Following the BGH Appellate Report,
market analysts have predicted that the
complicated nature of the multimillion-dollar case and the wording of the [AB] nd-
ing...leaves [sic] no doubt that a long legal wrangle between the two top trading powers
lies ahead. See EU, US Both Claim Victory in WTO Ruling, VIashington Post (16
January 1998), at A16.
172 See Report of the Panel on Japanese Measures Aecting Consumer Photographic
Film and Paper, 31 March 1998, 1998 VIL 208716 (W.T.O.), VIT/D544?R.
' USA Still Ahead Despite Kodak's Defeat, USA Today (10 December 1997), at
24A. 174 See supra note 84.
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80buer against a ViTO challenge. This enticement to confonnity reduces
the likelihood that a Member will impose a higher sanitary standard solely
in an eort to gain covert trade advantages, but the problem is actually the
very strength of the incentive it creates. The incentive to downward harmonize
creates additional pressure on Members seeking to establish higher levels of pro-
tection, who are likely to already be under pressure from industry and political
groups. The EU actually argued that the dierent levels of protection adopted
by it and the US reected the BC's precautionary approach [which placedi at-
tainment of a high level of consumer protection before the commercial interests
of farmers and phannaceutical companies.'76
One European professor of agricultural economics implores, The trouble with
the ViTO agreement is that it does not provide for any measures that are based
on consumer concern. It only provides for measures that are based on scientic
concerns.1 This statement appears quite true in light of the DSB's interpreta-
tion of the SPS Agreement. The EU, the US, and all the other members of the
ViTO must determine whether that is tolerable or appropriate.
Reminder. Finally, I would like to bring attention back to the issue
of the ViTO treaties as creatures of international law. Although it is important
to consider the potential limitations on food regulation created by the ViTO
treaty obligations, it is equally important to remember the limits on the ViTO.
Nations are not bound by decisions of the ViTO dispute settlement body in the
way that, for instance, the US federal and state
 See generally Charnovitz, supra note 114, at 478 (arguing that the WTO agree-
ments may result in
downward harmonization of public health and safety standards); Public Citizen, Har-
monization, supra
note 4 (making stronger version of same argument).
176 BGH Panel Report at 4.105.
Andrews, supra note 84 (quoting Stefan Tangermann, professor of agricultural
economics at the
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legislative bodies are bound by the decisions of the US Supreme Court.
Rather, parties to the dierent agreements are contracting parties. As with
most contracts, parties may violate their obligations so long as they pay the
price. DSU Art. 22.6 provides that Members who are parties to disputes can
elect to retain measures that have been found by the dispute settlement body
to be inconsistent with the ViTO agreements. At that point, the Member must
submit to arbitration to determine what countervailing trade sanctions may be
imposed on it by the Members aected by its decision not to act consistently
with the Agreements. Nonetheless, the price of retaliatory measures can be high,
and it is perhaps naive to believe that nations will be willing to pay forever in
the name of ethics.
B. Recommendations
In light of the ViTO dispute settlement body's interpretations of the GAFF
and the SPS Agreement, I would like to suggest possible areas of action for the
dierent
constituencies in the ViTO universe. The list is by no means exhaustive,
but raises some of the more dicult issues and recommends potential methods
of easing their resolution.
The WTO
 Actively consider the relationship between trade and environmental
measures pertaining to world food supplies, including the role of eco-labelling
and whether, and if so how, to allow Members to take PPM-related measures.
CTE should be clear about its recommendations and the ViTO clear about what
is allowed under the W'I'O
University of Gottingen in Germany).
Few international treaties include hard enforcement tools. In creating a treaty,
nations may oer each other a variety of carrots as incentives to abide by the treaty,
which in conjunction with political realities may assure adequate compliance, at least
with the spirit of the treaty. The inclusion of actual sticks in a
treaty, however, is extremely rare given politics, lack of a larger entity with au-
thority over all signatories (in contrast to a situation like the United States where the
federal government and the courts can generally
resolve state disputes), and fear on the part of each drafter that the stick could some-
day be turned on them.
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82agreements so that Members may either attempt to change the agreements,
change their interpretation, or leave the ViTO.
 Regarding the SPS Agreement, continue to apply a more exible ap-
proach when interpreting the relationship between a risk assessment and sovereign
risk management. Clarify what constitutes sucient scientic evidence. Min-
imizing intrusion into domestic policy-making will reduce the likelihood of a
consumer backlash against the ViTO and contribute to the legitimacy of the
ViTO dispute settlement process.
 In light of the designation of the Codex standards as international stan-
dards for purposes of the SPS Agreement, assure that the Codex Commission
is and remains apolitical. Since the Appellate Body concluded in BGH that
conservative risk management decisions are permissible under the Agreement,
consider the possibility of incorporating a factor into the Codex standards to
reect scientic uncertainty.
Doing so could make the state of the science more clear to panels when
determining whether measures that do not conform to the Codex standards are
nonetheless based on them. If Codex cannot act objectively and apolitically, it
should revert to a purely voluntary status as it was originally conceived.
National Governments
 Establish a list of important national policies that touch on trade. In the
future, before signing any new multilateral agreement, or agreeing to revisions
to an existing one,
' The EU raised the issue in the panel proceeding that the Codex standards for
the ve hormones at issue in the dispute were formally adopted by a very narrow
margin (33 for, 29 against, 7 abstentions), an
especially noteworthy occurrence given that Codex proposals are normally adopted
by a consensus. See BGH Panel Report at 8.67. In cases of such signicant scientic
disagreement, the inability of even the Codex to reach a consensus may weigh in favor
of giving deference to a Member's risk assessment.
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83consider the treaty's potential impact on those policies. For example, con-
duct an environmental assessment of the treaty before signing. If the govern-
ment ocial does not, than Congress must demand an opportunity for thorough
review before approval.
 Meanwhile, enter into multilateral agreements with major trading part-
ners and other nations with similar sanitary, labor, and environmental stan-
dards. By doing so, individual nations can assure that there will not be a race
to the minimum standards while also decreasing the economic impact in the
international market of voluntarily maintaining higher standards.
 To maintain consistency with the SPS Agreement, and to reduce the
likelihood of a ViTO challenge, conduct well-documented risk assessments when
implementing sanitary measures. Make these risk assessments available to other
Members in the interests of transparency and harmonization. Although the bur-
den of proof is initially on the complainant, having a clear scientic justication
for regulating before having to defend the measure will increase the likelihood
of successfully showing consistency with the SPS Agreement, as well as making
better policy at home.
 Be receptive to consumer concerns and make scientic evidence readily
available to consumers. Educate consumers on how the FDA and USDA make
food safety decisions. Demonstrating that a regulation is not warranted by a
conservative risk assessment will go a long way toward preventing a citizen back-
lash against the government for not implementing food standards in response
to consumer demand.'80
 The SPS agreement clearly indicates that bowing to public or political pressure
alone will not withstand VITO scrutiny, for instance if public fear of a food, food
additive, or food-producing technology is founded on the National Enquirer rather
than science.
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84 Consider consumer labeling programs and how to implement them in a
way that provides adequate information without creating an unnecessary panic
or, conversely, deadening consumers to labels.
 Decide whether your political body and your citizens can live with the
limits on sovereignty imposed by the ViTO agreements, particularly as they
relate to health risk assessments, environmental policymaking, and process dis-
tinctions generally. In all likelihood, the benets of belonging to the ViTO far
exceed the burdens, but long-term maintenance of osetting retaliatory trade
measures against you may not be politically feasible.
 Free trade without reference to conservation increases risks of unsus-
tainable growth and consumption, as well as providing an eective subsidy to
non-conservationist nations whose lower standards provide them a competitive
edge and threaten the world environment and consumers with downward harmo-
nization. The United States should take the lead on environmental conservation
and sustainable development measures.
Consumer and Environmental Advocates
 Help governments consider the implications of trade agreements for hard
questions.
 Monitor, publicize, and educate citizens about international develop-
ments that may impact their sovereign's ability to pass legislative in accordance
with the precautionary principle or a higher environmental ethical standard.
The complex, unfamiliar nature of treaties may mean that citizens are signif-
icantly less likely to understand or predict the implications of treaties than
traditional federal, state, or local legislation, let alone mobilize to discourage
treaty signature or ratication.
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85 Continue to question the procedural fairness of the ViTO, Codex, and
other international treaty regimes and organizations. Given the ViTO' s re-
peatedly stated goal of transparency, your experience in shedding light on bu-
reaucratic and political injustice and revealing important conicts of interest
can do much to improve the ViTO process and could even ultimately be what
makes it compatible with the values of the real people behind the WTO member
governments.
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